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1 Introduction  
 
This book is concerned with the various aspects of hierarchical collective behaviour which is 
manifested by most complex systems in nature. From the many of the possible topics, we plan to 
present a selection of those that we think are useful from the point of shedding light from very 
different directions onto our quite general subject. Our intention is to both present the essential 
contributions by the existing approaches as well as go significantly beyond the results obtained 
by traditional methods by applying a more quantitative approach then the common ones (there 
are many books on qualitative interpretations). In addition to considering hierarchy in systems 
made of similar kinds of units, we shall concentrate on problems involving either dominance 
relations or the process of collective decision-making from various viewpoints. 
 
1.1 General considerations 
 
Since hierarchy is abundant in nature and society, but many of its quantitative aspects are still 
unexplored, the main goal we intend to achieve is the systematic interpretation and 
documentation of new unifying principles and basic laws describing the most relevant aspects of 
hierarchy (being perhaps the most widespread organizing principle in the Universe). To do so we 
shall discuss recent experiments and models that are both simple and realistic enough to 
reproduce the observations and develop concepts for a better understanding of the complexity of 
systems consisting of many organisms. We shall cover systems ranging from flocks of birds to 
groups of people.  
The related research goes beyond being interdisciplinary and can be rather described as 
multidisciplinary, since it involves many kinds of systems (both living and non-living), various 
techniques and technologies typically used in different branches of science and engineering. The 
topics we address might look too diverse. However, one can always think of these research 
directions as facets of a single, to be explored idea. 
Although we shall concentrate on hierarchical collective behaviour in general, there will be 
two aspects of it which will pop up in the majority of cases: collective motion and dynamically 
changing partially directed networks (and the natural relation of the two). A few of the many 
possible examples are visualized in Fig. 1. In addition, we give a brief description of the most 
relevant concepts which hierarchy is related to. 
 
Organisms versus agents, entities or “particles” 
 
Throughout of this book we shall consider systems made of many (from a few dozens to several 
thousands) organisms, i.e., living entities. Of course, hierarchy is present in the non-living world 
as well; starting from elementary particles through the solar system up to the whole universe, but 
that is a beautiful and long story which is not the subject of the present work.  
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Fig. 1 a Axon arborisation (the end part of a major kind of neuronal cells) shows typical hierarchical tree-like 
structure in space. b The wiring of a human brain. Hierarchy is not obvious, but closer inspection and additional 
MRI images indicate hierarchical functional operation. c And this is a possible interpretation of how we think 
(thoughts being one of the end products of a functioning brain. d The visualization (of the by today 
commonplace) idea of the evolutionary tree. e The famous first drawing about the branching of the phylogenetic 
tree with the ―I think‖ note by Darwin. f This complex tree with its hundreds of branches shows the birth of new 
variants (associated with new plant species) of a single protein! g The well-known hierarchy of wolfs indicated 
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by who is licking who (subordinates do this with those above them). The same behaviour can be observed 
between a dog and her owner. h Perhaps the only hierarchy named after a person. This pyramid is called the 
―Maslov‘s hierarchy of needs‖. i Visualization of the connections (call relations) between the various parts of a 
C+ software system (containing many thousands of entities and relations: more closely related parts are colour 
coded and bundled). j The strength of the directional correlations between pairs of pigeons in a flock (individuals 
being denoted by A0,…,9. The asymmetric structure of the dominant part of the matrix (whole matrix minus its 
symmetric components) indicated strictly hierarchical leader-follower relations. k The picturesque representation 
of the two pyramids of medieval relations among the member s of a society: left corresponding to social, the 
right side corresponding to the religious organization. l And finally: we show a huge community of relatively 
simple animals. Where is here the hierarchy? Nowhere, the groups of many thousands of animals (large flocks of 
birds, schools of fish) typically do not display the signs of hierarchy (and, and, indeed, are assumed not to be 
hierarchically organized.) (All pictures are freely available from the internet except j which is from one of our 
papers)  
 
Hierarchy in life can be understood in several ways. For example, one may rank a quality as 
more important than another type of quality. However, in most of the cases hierarchy involves 
many ―units‖ which are related to each other in relatively simple ways. The stress is on ―many‖ 
and on ―simple‖. Perhaps the best way to demonstrate this point is to consider a group of people. 
The interactions (relations) among them can be extremely complicated (just think of two people 
being in love with each other). Instead of considering such interactions, we assume that two 
people, let us say, in a large organisation are either working in the same kind of unit or one of 
them has a job of a leader (of a group, a department, a division, etc.). In this case, we assume that 
there is a directed link between the two which is pointing from the leader to the regular member 
of the company. When accounting their relation, this will be the aspect we shall consider and all 
of the other, extremely complex features of the two persons (they are made of cells, they feel the 
smell of the other person, etc.) will be neglected.  
This is how ―particles‖ can be defined even for a system of people: particles are units whose 
interactions can be - in the given context (!) - assumed to be very simple. 
―Agents‖ are a bit more complicated than particles. Although their interactions are assumed 
to be also relatively simple, these units have a ―purpose‖. The purpose is usually also simple and 
can be interpreted as optimizing/maximizing some sort of advantageous quantity. In its most 
typical form this quantity is the difference between the ―benefit‖ and the ―cost‖ usually called 
fitness. Fitness can be defined for a whole group of agents as well.  
 
To summarize the above: hierarchy is typically defined for systems of agents and can be 
advantageous to a varying degree. One of the main messages of our text is that the main reason 
for the hierarchical structure of the relations among organism is that such a structure is more 
advantageous than a fully regular or a random or any other arrangement. 
 
Collective behaviour 
 
Collective behaviour applies to a great variety of phenomena in nature, which makes it an 
extremely useful notion in many contexts. Examples include collectively migrating bacteria, 
insects or birds; or phenomena where groups of organisms or non-living objects synchronize 
their signals — think of fireflies flashing in unison or people clapping in phase during rhythmic 
applause. The main features of collective behaviour are that an individual unit‘s action is 
dominated by the influence of its neighbours — the unit behaves differently from the way it 
would behave on its own. On one hand such systems show interesting ordering phenomena as the 
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units simultaneously change their behaviour to a common pattern (Camazine 2003, Sumpter 
2010) and on the other hand can form structures that are capable of exhibiting much more 
complex functions than a single unit (consider, e.g., a single neuron versus a complete brain). 
The world is made of many highly interconnected parts over many scales, whose 
interactions result in a complex behaviour needing separate interpretation for each level. This 
realization forces us to appreciate that new features emerge as one goes from one scale to 
another, so it follows that the science of complexity and the closely related hierarchy is about - 
following a classification based on major analogies - is expected to reveal the principles 
governing the ways by which these new properties appear. 
Over the past decades, one of the major successes of statistical physics has been the 
explanation of how certain patterns can arise through the interaction of a large number of similar 
units. Interestingly, the units themselves can be very complex entities, too, and their internal 
structure has little influence on the patterns they produce. It is much more the way they interact 
that determines the large-scale behaviour of the system. It has been found that not only 
interacting spins or atoms, but also assemblies of molecules or granular particles, and even large 
groups of complex biological structures (bacteria, ants, birds, etc.) can be examined by statistical 
physics models (Vicsek 2001).  It has been demonstrated that the collective behaviour of units 
has a number of features typical for many different systems. From the point of statistical physics 
these could be considered as ―universality classes‖ or major types of behavioural patterns.  
It is, however, very important to note that in the above context the hierarchical nature of 
interactions has been largely neglected, especially for the directed (or asymmetric) case (except a 
few network theory papers). Our basic assumption is that by observing and quantitatively 
interpreting the patterns of behaviour in hierarchically organized systems is likely to lead to a 
unified picture of hierarchical collective behaviour, and, in an ideal case, to the discovery of a 
number of basic relations or ―laws‖ describing them. 
 
Collective motion 
 
The actions of moving individual organisms add together creating patterns of motion, so 
complex that they seem to have been choreographed from ―above‖. Flocks and schools have a 
distinctive style of behaviour - with fluidity and a seeming intelligence that far transcends the 
abilities of their members. Vast congregations of birds, for example, are capable of turning 
sharply and suddenly en masse, always avoiding collisions within the flock. It has turned out 
over the two decades that computer models and sophisticated techniques to collect data about a 
large number of animals have been very useful for establishing a significantly better 
understanding of such systems than before (Vicsek and Zafeiris 2012).  
 
Networks 
 
When ―generating‖ life as we perceive it today, nature ―made use of‖ the existence of the above 
mentioned hierarchical levels by spontaneously separating them as molecules, macromolecules, 
cells, organisms, species and societies. The big question is whether there is a unified theory for 
the ways elements of a system organize themselves to produce such a highly hierarchical 
structure of behaviour typical for wide classes of systems. Interesting principles have been 
proposed, including self-organization, simultaneous existence of many degrees of freedom, self-
adaptation, rugged energy/fitness landscapes and scaling, etc. Physicists are learning how to 
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build relatively simple models producing complicated behaviour. At the same time researchers 
working on inherently very complex systems (biologists or economists, say) are uncovering the 
ways how their infinitely complicated subjects can be interpreted in terms of interacting, well-
defined (i.e., simpler) units (such as proteins) with the interactions corresponding to links (which 
can be directed and weighted) and the units to nodes (having attributes) in a complex network 
(Albert and Barabási 2002, Newman 2010, Barabási 2016).  
Most of the networks in life and technology are dynamically changing and are highly 
structured. For example, a dynamically changing network can be associated with a flock of 
collectively moving organisms or robots interacting as a function of their positions.  
 
1.2 Motivation  
 
It is widely accepted that we do not understand deeply enough the reasons behind the abundance 
of multi-level hierarches. However, there must be an advantage of such an organization, because 
of the permanent evolution of the corresponding systems preferring more efficient variants. But 
where is this advantage? Better adaptability? A more efficient, robust or stable structure? A faster 
spreading of relevant information? Or, perhaps, better controllability (think of, e.g., an army)? 
On a more abstract level: What are the conditions for a hierarchical organization to emerge? Are 
there any general (valid for many systems) necessary and/or sufficient condition for this 
emergence?  
These are challenging questions and if we can answer them it could bring us to designing 
and producing much more efficient devices or perhaps, more importantly, creating much better 
functioning industrial, educational or many more kinds of organizations. 
Motivated by the above reasons, in this book will be centered around topics and answers 
related to questions like: 
 
What is our subject? 
 
We shall consider primarily systems (structures, processes, phenomena) that are common in the 
living world. The related, practical questions are: what are the conditions under which hierarchy 
emerges? What kinds of mathematical tools are appropriate for describing the various aspects of 
hierarchy? 
 
Why do we study? 
 
We use a quantitative approach to interpreting realistic situations in life because most of the 
presently available experimental and theoretical treatments of hierarchical organization are 
predominantly qualitative so a need arises in presenting results involving numerics. On the other 
hand, the interest in the topic seems to be increasing quickly. Understanding leadership and 
further aspects of hierarchy are expected to be very useful from the point of optimizing 
economy-related structures. On a less applied level, getting a deeper insight into the collective 
behaviour of groups has also been attracting growing interest.   
  
How do we study? 
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As mentioned above (and explored here in a bit more detail) there can be several methods to treat 
the various quantitative aspects of hierarchy. First, it is possible – but far from being trivial – to 
design experiments for studying how a hierarchical set of leader-follower relationship emerges 
from an originally disordered set of living entities. Second, one can design models and study 
them either analytically or using computer simulations. The two major quantitative approaches 
have been: game theory and agent-based modelling. In this book we treat the second alternative, 
since the game theoretical works we know of allow a less straightforward comparison with 
actual, real life observations and experiments. A rare but important exception is the very recent 
book by Boix (2015) delivering an impressive mixture of calculations, facts and ideas to treat 
large scale (political) hierarchy. Our work, concerned with hierarchies on a smaller scale of 
groups or collectives can be looked at as complementing the book of Boix. 
 
1.3 Hierarchical structures in space and in networks 
 
There exist a few fields in sciences which are closely related to the general notion of hierarchy, 
but fall beyond the scope of our work (they represent the self-similar aspect of hierarchy). This is 
mainly so because these areas represent a research field of their own. In addition, in most of the 
present book we consider hierarchy as a set of related entities, such that the relation between two 
connected entities is directed (one is, in ways later to be specified, plays a role being 
superior/leading/embedding etc. considering the other entity). Thus, here we only briefly touch 
upon the topic of spatially hierarchical objects (called fractals) and undirected (symmetric 
relations) but still hierarchical networks (called scale free). For further details about such self-
similar aspects of hierarchy we suggest that the readers use as a source the following books 
(Falconer 2003, Feder 1988, Vicsek 1992 - about fractals, and Barábasi 2009, Newman 2010, 
Newman et al. 2006, Dorogovtsev and Mendez 2003, Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani 2007) – 
about networks and scale free networks). 
Fractals are objects for which the topological dimension (the number of independent 
directions one can move into from a given point of the fractal) is smaller than the dimension of 
the Euclidean space they can be embedded into. They also possess a self-similar geometry which 
means that a small part of a fractal has the same statistical features than the whole. Here by the 
expression ―same statistical features‖ we typically understand that the density correlations are the 
same. This is equivalent to saying that scaling up (blowing up) a small part of a fractal results in 
a structure which is statistically identical to the full fractal itself.  This is a non-trivial feature and 
involves the fact that the dimension of the fractals is a non-integer number as opposed to regular 
objects having dimensions 1, 2 or 3. 
Interestingly enough, a large variety of living systems involve fractal geometry in one way 
or another. As one proceeds from simpler to more complex manifestations of life, it is possible to 
encounter fractal bacteria colonies (Matsuyama and Matsushita 1993), ant trails (Jun et al. 2003) 
or the network of blood vessels in higher order organisms described by - among other important 
features - by the so called allometric scaling laws in biology in general (West et al. 1997) and, in 
particular, in mammalian metabolism (see, e.g., White and Seymour 2005). Perhaps on the 
largest scale built by organisms are the cities we live in display fractal-like features as well 
(Batty and Longley 1994). 
The so-called scale-free networks can also be considered as manifestations of a self-similar 
structure. Such a structure is not realized in space but shows up in the specific way the entities of 
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a system are connected to each other. Using the language of network theory, the degree of a node 
(entity) is the number of edges (connections) this node has leading to its neighbours in the 
network. The degrees may follow all sorts of distributions, but if this distribution is a power law 
then the degree distribution is invariant under scaling: a smaller part of the network will possess 
the same power law distribution as the whole network.  
The possible examples for systems which can be characterised in terms of scale-free 
networks are numerous. Most of these are not assumed to exist in real space. Going from smaller 
to larger scale, examples include networks corresponding to the interactions among proteins in a 
cell, then, with a large jump, many human made systems (internet, web pages, airlines, etc.) or 
the various networks of social interactions (friendships, collaborations, industrial relations, etc.). 
There are, however some spatial structures that can be best interpreted in terms of 
hierarchical networks. Louf et al. (2013) introduced a generic model for the growth of a spatial 
network based on a general concept of cost-benefit analysis. Their model leads to a wide variety 
of hierarchical spatial structures (trees) minimizing a conditions-dependent fitness function. The 
work by Daqing et al. (2011) connects the fractal and the network aspects of a structures by 
calculating the dimensions of spatially embedded networks. 
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2 Definitions and Basic Concepts  
 
As we indicated in the introduction, the notion of hierarchy applies to a great variety of topics 
and contexts, let it be the social structure of animal groups, human virtues, psychological needs 
or the structure of a computer program. Accordingly, it does not have a compact, precise, widely 
accepted definition that would be applicable for all cases. Available definitions usually by-pass 
the problem of clarification by using synonymous words – which are, unfortunately, similarly 
unclear. For example, according to the Cambridge dictionary, hierarchy is ―a system in which 
people or things are arranged according to their importance.‖ Here ―importance‖ is the keyword, 
but importance is highly subjective: something that is important in a given context might not be 
important at all from another point of view. Here we also find that hierarchy corresponds to ―the 
people in the upper levels of an organization who control it‖. So we learn that it is about control, 
but according to this definition, hierarchy is restricted to people in an organization – which is a 
very narrow interpretation. Checking a very popular cite, Wikipedia, we find that ―A hierarchy 
(from the Greek hierarchia, "rule of a high priest", from hierarches, "leader of sacred rites") is an 
arrangement of items (objects, names, values, categories, etc.) in which the items are represented 
as being "above," "below," or "at the same level as" one another‖. However, this interpretation 
does not inform us about the basic aspects of the arrangement, which represent, on the other 
hand, the heart of the problem. 
As we shall see, it turns out from more strict investigations that usually we talk about 
hierarchy if entities of a system can be classified into levels in a way that elements of a higher 
level determine or constrain the behaviour and/or characteristics of entities in a lower level. 
That is, in the heart of hierarchy we find control of behaviour.  
 
Definition: A system is hierarchical if it has elements (or subsystems) that are in dominant-
subordinate relation with each other. A unit is dominant over another unit to the extent of its 
ability to influence behaviour of the other. In this relation, the latter unit is called subordinate.  
 
 
Fig. 2.1 An example for flow hierarchy. The 
feeding-queuing hierarchical structure of a 
pigeon flock. Each square represents an 
individual. The edges point from the higher 
ranked bird towards the subordinate one with 
edge widths corresponding to the ability to 
influence the behaviour of the lower ranked 
individual. For the sake of better visibility, 
higher ranked notes are depicted higher on the 
picture. Reproduced from Nagy et al. (2013). 
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A typical hierarchical structure can be seen in Fig. 2.1 depicting the ranks within a pigeon 
flock. The inner structure of the group has been established by observing and measuring the 
feeding-queuing behaviour of its members (Nagy et al. 2013)  
Note that this definition does not tell how hierarchical the system is. Instead, it expresses 
whether its elements (or subsystems) are in hierarchical relation or not (manifesting itself in a 
dominant-subordinate relation). Furthermore, it tells the origin (reason) and extent of the 
dominant-subordinate relation. Consider for example the Rock–paper–scissors game. According 
to the rules,  
 
 The rock blunts the scissors (and hence ―disarms‖ it, beats it) 
 The scissors cut the paper, and 
 The paper covers the stone. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows how the elements overpower each other. Based on the above definition, the 
hierarchical (dominant-subordinate) relation among the units is clear, but the hierarchical nature 
of the whole system is not: is this network hierarchical at all? 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 The graph representation of the rock-
paper-scissors game. The dominant-subordinate 
relationship among the elements is clear, but the 
hierarchical nature of the entire system is not. 
 
 
 
In other words, from a graph-theoretical point of view, the above definition gives a lead 
regarding the arrows (where they should be and what is their deeper meaning) but it does not tell 
us how hierarchical the entire system is. At this point, we choose to keep it this way, mainly 
because the extent of hierarchy within a system has subjective aspects: for some, the rock-paper-
scissors game is ―fully‖ hierarchical, since its elements are clearly in hierarchical relation. For 
others it is not, because no source (leader) can be determined. 
Many approaches have been proposed to measure the hierarchy of a network, but none of 
them is ―universal‖, or accepted by everyone for all cases. Sect. 2.1.2 ―Measuring the level of 
hierarchy‖, gives an overview of these measures and algorithms. 
 
A few comments related to the definition: 
 
 During different group activities the influence of the members might vary. In other 
words, hierarchy is context/task sensitive, even in the same group! For example, as we 
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shall see it in Sect. 3.1.3, ―Leadership versus dominance‖, the members of the same 
pigeon flock arrange themselves into different hierarchies according to the actual activity: 
when they feed, the ranks are entirely different from the ones that can be observed during 
flight. This phenomenon is even more expressed in human groups. 
 
 Hierarchy might vary over time. As certain characteristics of the group members change 
over time (for example the physical strength of the individuals in a pack of wolves) so do 
their ranks.  
 
 This definition implies that the units behave somehow, or have some observable 
characteristics. In other words, entities without observable behaviour or characteristics 
cannot form a hierarchical structure. 
 
 The influence can be either forced by the higher ranked individual (e.g., when a higher 
ranked pigeon does not let a lower ranked one near to the food source), or it can be 
voluntary (for example leader-follower relationships during flight). 
 
 A higher ranked unit, by influencing the behaviour of other units more extensively, has a 
larger effect on the collective (emergent) group behaviour as well. 
 
 
Hierarchical systems can by classified into the following subtypes: 
 
1. Order hierarchy is basically an ordered set, in which a value is assigned to each element 
characterizing one of its arbitrarily chosen features. This assigned value defines the rank 
of the entity within the hierarchy. An example for this can be the ranking of artists, e.g. 
painters or sculptors, based on the average price of their artworks. In this example the 
―set‖ is composed by the artists, and the feature is the average price of their artwork. 
Another example can be a hierarchy of firms, ordered by, say, the number of employees. 
In this type, the network behind the system is neglected or it does not exist. More 
formally, this type of hierarchy is ―equivalent to an ordering induced by the values of a 
variable defined on some set of elements‖ (Lane 2006). 
 
2. Nested (or embedded, containment, inclusive) hierarchy is a structure in which entities 
are embedded into each other. Higher level entities consist of and contain lower level 
entities, or, as Wimberley (2009) has formulated it, ―larger and more complex systems 
consist of and are dependent upon simpler systems and essential system-component 
entities‖. (According to some categorizations, a nested hierarchy can contain only one 
entity at each lower level, a bit like in case of the Russian Matryoshka dolls, while a 
generalized nested hierarchy allows multiple objects.) Uncovering nested hierarchy 
structure within a system is closely related to community detection in graphs. 
Containment hierarchy has two sub types: 
 A subsumptive containment hierarchy (a.k.a. taxonomic hierarchy) is a structure 
in which items are classified from specific to general. For example domestic cats, 
lions, tigers and cheetahs (gepards) belong to the family of cats called ―Felidae‖, 
dogs, foxes and wolfs belong to the family of carnivorans a.k.a. ―Canidae‖, 
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Canidae and Felidae both belong to the order of Carnivora, etc (See Fig. 2.3 a). 
Entities are containers, containing other containers.  
Mathematically this arrangement can be formulated as:  
Foxes ⊂ Canidae ⊂ Carnivora (and Carnivora ⊂ Mammals ⊂ Animals, to go 
further on). Each entity in a lower level ―is an‖ entity of a higher level: a fox ―is 
a‖ Canidae, a Canidae ―is a‖ Carnivora, a fox ―is a‖ mammal, etc. It is assumed 
that entities on a lower level are proper (or strict) subsets of the entities on a 
higher level. 
 Compositional containment hierarchy (a.k.a. level hierarchy) describes how a 
system is composed of subsystems, which are also composed of subsystems, etc. 
The ―hierarchy of life‖ is the best example for this structure, describing how 
organisms are composed of organ systems, which are composed of organs, which 
are composed of tissues, which are composed of cells, etc., see Fig. 2.3 b. Two 
important features often (but not always) appear in this type of hierarchy: firstly, 
there is a ―scalar quality‖, meaning that entities on higher levels are often bigger 
than entities on lower levels (a cell is bigger than a molecule). Secondly, 
emergent properties – properties that are not present on lower levels, but due to 
interactions among the units, appear on higher levels – also often accompany this 
structure. For example consciousness appears on the level of the brain (which is 
an organ), but it originates from the interactions of the neuron cells. Emergent 
properties are of prime importance, since they are a fundamental characteristic of 
―complex systems‖. 
 
3. Flow (or control) hierarchy: ―intuitively‖ it is an acyclic, directed graph. The nodes are 
layered into levels in a way that nodes on higher levels influence nodes on lower levels, 
and the influence is represented by edges. Layers refer to power, that is, an entity on a 
higher level gives orders or passes on information to entities on lower levels. This is 
where the name is coming from: such a structure represents the flow of orders, or, 
equivalently, how entities control other entities. Armies, churches, schools, political 
parties and institutions are typically organized in this way. Downwards orders flow on the 
edges, upwards pointing edges correspond to requests or sending information. 
Technological systems are also often organized in this way. In this case a central unit 
controls devices which control lower level devices, etc. At the bottom-most level sensors 
do not control anything directly, but they send information upwards, which are used to 
refine the decision making process done by devices on higher levels. (See Fig. 2.1) 
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Fig. 2.3 The two types of containment hierarchies: ―taxonomic‖ and ―compositional‖. a In a taxonomic (or 
subsumptive) containment hierarchy entities are containers, containing other containers. b A compositional 
containment (or level) hierarchy describes how a system is composed of subsystems, which are also composed of 
subsystems, etc. The best known example for this type of hierarchy is the ―hierarchy of life‖. b is Reproduced from 
Mader (2010).  
 
 
Importantly, these hierarchy types are not independent of each other. On the one hand, many 
systems can be described by more than one type. For example, members of an army form control 
hierarchy in a way that people having higher rank give orders to lower-rank soldiers, but, at the 
same time, the very same army forms a compositional containment hierarchy as well.  This is so 
since an army is composed of various divisions (infantry divisions, motorized divisions, airborne 
divisions, etc.) which are also composed of smaller contingents, all the way down to the soldiers, 
who are the ―units‖ in this structure. 
 On the other hand, both order and nested hierarchies can be converted to flow hierarchy. 
In an order hierarchy, a directed edge can be assigned to each pair of adjacent members in the 
hierarchy and this produces a chain of directed edges. In a nested hierarchy, a virtual node is 
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assigned to every sub-graph, and if a sub-graph contains another, then the two corresponding 
virtual nodes are connected with a directed link, which produces a flow hierarchy on the network 
of virtual nodes. 
Thus, flow hierarchy is the most important variant and we shall mainly concentrate on its 
manifestations.  
 
2.1 Describing hierarchical structures  
 
In this chapter we shall briefly summarize the basic concepts related to graphs, the mathematical 
object most often used in relation to hierarchy. It is important to highlight that graphs and 
networks are only the models of the real-life systems, not the systems themselves. It is a 
mathematical representation of the system under investigation, used because they, using graph 
theoretical methods and algorithms described in subsequent chapters, can reveal many important 
characteristics. An important further comment is that – as it is done in the literature – we shall 
use the term graphs for abstract mathematical constructions, while the term networks will be 
associated with the underlying interactions within a real-life structure. Readers familiar with 
graphs may skip this chapter. 
 
2.1.1 Graphs and networks  
 
As mentioned above, the most commonly used mathematical tool for describing hierarchical 
systems are graphs. Primarily, but not exclusively, they are connected to systems embodying 
flow (or control) hierarchy. Such systems and their graph representations go so much hand in 
hand, that when trying to assign a ―hierarchy value‖ to a system (describing ―how hierarchical‖ 
the given structure is), usually it is the hierarchy level of the graph (representing the system) that 
is measured. 
The concept behind this representation is rather straightforward: the entities of the systems 
are the nodes of the graph, and if a pair of entities is in a subordinate-dominance relation, then 
there is a directed edge between them. 
In the followings, we give a short overview of the basic graph theoretical concepts. 
 
 A graph is a mathematical tool which is appropriate to handle a set of objects with 
connections among them. The objects are represented by nodes and the connections 
between them by edges. Formally, G = {V, E} with a function f : E → V × V . The 
elements of V are the nodes (or vertices, or points), and the elements of E are the edges of 
the graph. The nodes are usually denoted by small Latin letters (e.g. i, j, k) or by Arabic 
numbers (1, 2, ..., N). Formally, f sends edges to pairs of vertices (which are the 
―endpoints‖ of the edge), but in practice we usually forget about the function f and simply 
think of E (the set of edges) as a subset of V × V . Accordingly, edges are usually given 
by the starting and nodes, such as e = (i, j), for any e ∈ E. The word network is often 
used as synonym for graph in the case it stands for actually observed data. 
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 A graph can be either directed or undirected. In case of a directed graph (or digraph) the 
relation has a special direction as well. For example, in case of a hierarchy network, the 
direction can show which element dominates which other. In contrast, in an undirected 
graph the connections do not have special directions, like in the network representing the 
flight connections among cities. Informally speaking, in case of an undirected graph the 
edges are just ―lines‖, and in case of digraphs, they are ―arrows‖. 
 
 A simple loop is an edge that connects a node to itself. (An edge whose starting and 
endpoint is the same vertex.) 
 
 A path in a graph is a sequence of connected vertices. (Most definitions specify that the 
nodes within a path have to be distinct from each other.) 
 
 A cycle is a closed path, that is, a path whose beginning and endpoint is the same vertex. 
Many times cycles are also referred to as loops. 
 
 A tree is a graph in which there are no loops, cycles or multiple edges. In other words, it 
is a graph in which any two nodes are connected by exactly one path. There are two 
special kinds of vertices: (i) the root node, which does not have parents, and the leaves 
(or end-nodes), which do not have children. Accordingly, in a tree, nodes can be layered 
into levels. 
 
 A cluster (a.k.a. module, community or cohesive group) is a part of the graph in which the 
units are more densely connected to each other than to the rest of the graph. We will use 
this elastic description, since the concept does not have a well-defined, widely accepted 
definition. Importantly, in real-life networks, the presence of such modules is a signature 
of the hierarchical nature of the structure (see, e.g., Vicsek 2002, Ravasz et al. 2002, Palla 
et al. 2005). 
 
 A directed community is simply a community in a directed graph. Here the nodes can be 
related to each other based on the number of their incoming and outgoing links 
connecting them to other nodes within the same module. A node having more outgoing 
edges towards other members of the module is more like a ―source‖-node, whereas a 
node with mostly incoming links from these members is more like a ―drain‖. (Palla et al. 
2007) 
 
 Vertices can be characterised by the number of links they have, reflecting how ―strongly‖ 
they are connected to other nodes. Accordingly, the degree of a node in an undirected 
graph is simply the number of its edges. In a directed graph vertices can be characterised 
by their in-degree and out-degree values: the in-degree value refers to the number of 
links pointing towards the given node, whereas the out-degree value refers the number of 
links going outwards from the vertex. 
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2.1.2 Measuring the level of hierarchy  
 
In this section we shall focus on measures for flow hierarchies. More precisely, we consider 
measures for graphs representing flow hierarchy. We have two main reasons to do so: (i) 
observations and experiments, as well as results of computer simulations are likely to return flow 
hierarchy, (ii) all other hierarchy types can be transformed into flow hierarchy in a rather straight 
forward way. For example, considering a containment hierarchy, its clusters can be identified 
with the nodes of a graph in which the directed edges will indicate the containment relation. That 
is, in the graph there will be an edge pointing from node A to node B, if cluster B fully contains 
cluster A in the original structure (Nepusz 2013). 
Most of the proposed measures take values on the [0, 1] interval, returning nearly 0 for a 
completely hierarchy-less structure, like a full graph or a circle, and returning a value close to 1 
for ‖completely hierarchical‖ structures, like a directed tree. Values for transient structures are 
up to ―intuitions‖, and intuitions differ from person to person. This is one of the main reasons 
why there is no ―most appropriate‖ measure serving all needs. The measures reviewed in the 
present book have values on the [0, 1] interval, with higher values representing higher degree of 
hierarchy. 
This section of the book is relatively extensive for two reasons: (i) it is about an obviously 
central quantitative characteristic of a hierarchical structure, (ii) in spite of its essential 
importance there is no unique definition of the level of hierarchy of a system.  
This latter situation is analogous to that of the definition of a community in a network. The 
notion itself is so complex that, depending on the aspect that we are interested in, a suitable 
definition should be chosen. For example, a community (cluster) in a network can be defined as a 
sub-network of nodes that have relatively more connections among them than with the other 
nodes. However, we can require this ―relatively more‖ in various ways. Directed, weighted and  
connections specified according to further criteria make the problem of defining clusters in a 
network an open problem even more .  
To introduce this aspect of the problem of finding the best measure of hierarchy, the reader 
is asked to consider the following question: please decide which structure is more hierarchical. A 
set of nodes arranged into layers connected by directed edges all directing from an upper to a 
lower layer or a ―star‖ consisting of a central node from which a number of directed edges lead 
to the other nodes of the network? To us, the right answer is: it depends on the context, on the 
function, etc. Next we account for a number of relevant possible angles from which such a 
question can be approached. 
 
Global Reaching Centrality  
The central idea of this approach is to give a rank to each node by measuring its ―impact‖ on 
other nodes. Impact is defined by the ratio of vertices that can be reached from the focal node i. 
Local reaching centrality, CR(i) defines exactly this quantity: in a directed, un-weighted graph, 
CR(i) is the maximum number of vertices that can be reached from node i, divided by N − 1. 
Then, the level of hierarchy is inferred from the distribution of the local reaching centralities: the 
more heterogeneous the distribution is, the more hierarchical the corresponding graph/network 
is. In order to demonstrate this statement (namely, that the distributions of the local reaching 
centralities reveal the hierarchical nature of a network), three different graph types are compared 
in Fig. 2.4: an Erdős-Rényi (random) graph (which is not hierarchical), a tree (which is highly 
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hierarchical), and a scale free graph (which is ―moderately‖ hierarchical). The most 
homogeneous CR(i) distribution belongs to the Erdős-Rényi (ER) graph: the CR(i) values are 
either 0 or close to 1, marked by the two narrow spikes at these values with a solid black line. In 
contrast, we find all kinds of CR(i) values in a tree, as it is indicated by the red line in Fig. 2.4 
(note the log-log scale). 
This distribution follows a power law that is distorted due to the random branching numbers. 
The blue dashed line belongs to the ―moderately hierarchical‖ scale free graph, marking a 
―moderately heterogeneous‖ distribution. 
These curves represent distributions, while for a measure we expect a number. The 
definition proposed by Mones et al. (2012) grasps the heterogeneity of the CR(i) distribution as 
follows: Let CR
max
 denote the highest local reaching centrality in a graph G = (V,E). Then, the 
Global Reaching Centrality, GRC, is defined as: 
 
 
    
∑ [  
𝑚     ( )]   
   
 
(2.1) 
 
where V is the set of nodes, and N is the number of nodes in G. The GRC values for our three 
example graphs (Tree, Scale-free and Erdős-Rényi), are the following: 
 
 Tree: 0.997 ± 0.001, which is the highest. 
 Scale-free: 0.127 ± 0.008, that is, SF networks are slightly hierarchical, 
 Erdős-Rényi: 0.058 ± 0.005, that is, these are not hierarchical at all. 
 
These values, the means and variances, are calculated for an ensemble of 1000 graphs, and 
they demonstrate that the returned values are close to our ―intuitions‖. Eq. (2.1) applies to 
directed, un-weighted graphs. Its generalized version is suitable for analysing weighted and/or 
undirected graphs by an appropriate modified definition of the local reaching centrality (Mones 
et al. 2012). 
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Fig. 2.4 Distributions of the local reaching centralities for three kinds of directed networks: Tree, Erdős-Rényi 
(ER) and scale-free (SF). All the curves are averages of 1000 graphs with N=2000, of the appropriate graph type. 
Reproduced from Mones et al. (2012). 
 
 
Random Walk Measure  
 
The main motivation of this approach is the claim that – in contrast to the assumptions behind 
most of the proposed methods – it is not correct to treat all directed acyclic graphs as already 
maximally hierarchical, independently of their inner structure. This observation is based on 
the common intuition that a hierarchical structure often corresponds to a multi -level pyramid 
in which the levels become more and more wide as one descends from the higher levels 
towards the lower ones. 
The measure proposed by Czégel and Palla (2015) is based on properties of random walks 
within the graph, and, in accordance to the above mentioned claim, directed trees 
corresponding to multi-level pyramidal structures obtain higher hierarchy values than directed 
stars or chains.  
Intuitively, the method is based on the assumption that there is information flow coming 
from the high-ranking nodes towards to ones at the bottom, similarly as in the case of an army 
or company, where the leaders send instructions downwards the links. In order to track the 
sources of the instructions/information, etc., random walkers are dropped onto the nodes who 
then move backwards on the links. Once a steady state is reached, the density of such random 
walkers (the number of them visiting a given node) can be interpreted as being proportional to 
the rank of this node: high random walker density indicates that the vertex is a source of 
information, low density indicates the vertex is more likely to be just a ―receiver‖ of orders – 
that is, low in rank. The hierarchical nature of the network is then estimated based on the 
22 
 
distribution of these random walker densities: if the distribution is homogeneous, the source 
of information/order cannot be pinpointed, thus, the network is not hierarchical. In contrast, 
inhomogeneous distribution indicates clear information sources: the network is hierarchical. 
This homogeneity/inhomogeneity is measured with a value called H, with higher values 
reflecting more hierarchical structures (bigger inhomogeneity), and lower values less 
hierarchical networks. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.5 Hierarchy scores as a function of the network size. The different symbols correspond to different 
networks. The x axis marks the size of the network (N, number of nodes) on a logarithmic scale, whereas the 
y coordinate shows the hierarchy value (H) of the graph. Reproduced from Czégel and Palla (2015) 
 
 
The largest H values belong to regulatory networks, electric circuits and food webs, whereas 
the lowest ones belong to the informal networks of acquaintances in different organizations 
(Fig. 2.5). Moderately hierarchical are the Internet, various citation-, metabolic- language and 
trust networks, which results are in good accordance to our intuitive expectations.  
An even clearer picture regarding the hierarchical nature of a network can be obtained by 
―normalizing‖ the hierarchy measure H against the hierarchy measure of the same network, but 
under the assumption of random connections. This is the ―z-score‖, defined as: 
 
 
  
  ⟨ ⟩
 ( )
 
(2.2) 
 
where H is the hierarchy score,  <H> is the expected H value of the randomized graph, and 
σ(H) is the standard deviation of H in the randomized ensemble. 
 
 An overview of further useful measures 
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In the rest of the section we shall give an overview of some further measures, focusing on the 
main ideas behind them. Here our aim is not to give detailed description of the techniques but 
rather to flip through the type of concepts that have been proposed so far regarding the problem 
of measuring the hierarchy level of a graph.  
 
A measure for undirected networks 
 
The measure proposed by Trusina et al. (2004) quantifies the flow hierarchy of undirected 
networks. It is based on the assumption that every vertex already has a rank associated with it by 
denoting its place in the global hierarchy. This estimate for the rank can be the degree of the 
node (originally proposed by the authors) but can be other conceivable measures as well, such as 
betweenness centrality or eigenvector centrality. With these assumptions, the hierarchy measure 
is given by the fraction of directed shortest paths going strictly upwards in the hierarchy.  
More precisely, this method assumes that the shortest paths in the network consist of a part 
going upward the hierarchy (towards more important nodes), followed by a part going downward 
the hierarchy (towards less important nodes). Either part may be empty of course, but one should 
not turn back upwards after the downward part again. Paths of this type are said to be 
hierarchical, and the measure simply calculates the fraction of vertex pairs that are connected by 
a hierarchical shortest path. 
 
Determining the levels of organizations 
 
One of the first methods was proposed by Krackhardt (1994), whose main motivation was to 
measure the levels of hierarchy of organizations. He defined four measures that can be used 
together as an estimate to the extent of flow hierarchy in networks. These measures are: 
 
 Hierarchy: The fraction of unordered vertex pairs (i, j) such that vertex i is reachable from 
vertex j but vertex j is not reachable from vertex i, or vice versa. It works on directed graphs 
only.  
 Connectedness: The fraction of unordered vertex pairs (i, j) such that vertex j is reachable 
from vertex i via a directed path or vertex i is reachable from vertex j.  
 Efficiency: One minus the proportion of possible ―extra‖ edges that are not needed to 
maintain connectedness of the components. It is assumed that each component should be an 
out-tree (as an archetype of perfect hierarchy) and thus a component of size N must have at 
most N-1 links; any more than that is a violation of efficiency. This measure obviously 
penalizes cases when there are two separate paths leading upwards the hierarchy from a node 
A to its superior B; one of the paths is not required to maintain connectedness, hence the 
structure is inefficient.  
 LUBness: For each unordered pair of vertices (i, j), the lowest upper bound (LUB) is a vertex 
k such that both i and j are reachable from k. LUBness is the fraction of pairs having a LUB. 
This definition can be explained by Krackhardt's assumption of an out-tree being the perfect 
hierarchy one can achieve. 
 
Each of these metrics may take values from zero to one, and each metric measures some 
kind of a ―deviation‖ from the perfect hierarchy Krackhardt assumed, i.e., a directed out-tree. (It 
also applies for in-trees if we reverse the edge directions in the definition of LUBness). 
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However, these measures (with the exception of efficiency) can be calculated only for directed 
networks. 
 
Concept for containment hierarchies 
 
Unlike the measures presented so far, the concept of Ravasz and Barabási (2003) addresses the 
notion of containment hierarchies. They observed that log k and log C are correlated in many 
real-world networks (where k is the vertex degree and C is the local clustering coefficient).  
They argue that this is due to a containment hierarchy in the network (although they have 
not used the word ―containment‖). In order to determinate this, they proposed a simple recursive 
generation process that creates graphs with a power-law degree distribution, a linear dependence 
between log k and log C and multiple levels of hierarchies contained within each other. The 
bottom line of their argument is that hierarchy in undirected networks can be quantified by 
looking at the log k vs. log C plot and fitting a straight line to the data; the larger the slope of the 
line is, the more hierarchical the network is. 
 
Layout-motivated measure 
 
Carmel et al. (2002) proposed a layout-based metric for measuring the amount of hierarchy in a 
directed graph. They have conceived a layout algorithm that places the nodes of the graph in 2D 
space such that a set of constrains related to the target level differences are taken into account as 
much as possible. More formally, this means the following. For each i-j edge, we assign a 
measure that describes the desired difference between the y coordinates of vertex i and vertex j. 
The graph is then laid out using their algorithm, and the difference between the maximal (maxY) 
and minimal y coordinates (minY) is compared to the diameter of the graph. A strictly 
hierarchical graph with no cycles can be laid out in a way that the distance between levels is 1, 
thus the difference between maxY and minY is equal to the diameter, while a cycle (i.e. a 
perfectly un-hierarchical graph) would be laid out with equal y coordinates, yielding a hierarchy 
measure of zero. 
 
The disadvantages of this method are twofold: 
 
 In the general case, it is not possible to assign desired target level differences to the 
edges. We could simply say that the desired difference is 1 for all the edges, but this 
would work only if none of the edges span more than one layer. Edges skipping layers 
but otherwise pointing to the right direction would skew the layout and decrease the 
hierarchy measure 
 This measure is not applicable to undirected graphs. 
 
.  
Measures for structures “from down to top” 
 
Next in contrast to the way we assumed above, we shall consider the edges of directed networks 
to be oriented upwards (i.e. from lower to higher levels), like on a who-reports-to-whom 
organization diagram. We do so in order to follow the terminology of the related literature. It is 
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usually straightforward to apply the definitions to directed networks that use the opposite 
convention. 
Sometimes we will talk about layers or levels (sets of nodes with the same rank). Layers are 
indexed from 1 upwards, and a lower layer index corresponds to a higher rank. 
Some of these measures will work on networks where the ranks of individual nodes are not 
known in advance; others are defined for a network and a corresponding ranking of nodes, and 
therefore must be optimized by some optimization procedure when the ranks are unknown. 
 
Fraction of edges participating in cycles 
 
Here the main idea is to reveal somehow the possible asymmetry between nodes by assuming 
some sort of flow on the links, and then check if these flows exhibit any kind of overall 
directionality or not. One way to do so is to find all of the elementary cycles in the network, 
count the edges participating in them, and divide this number by the total number of edges. This 
approach works for undirected and directed graphs as well; in directed graphs, only directed 
cycles matter. (A cycle is elementary if no vertex appears in it twice). 
All the elementary cycles in a directed graph can be found simply using Johnson‘s algorithm 
(Johnson 1975), which is O((N+E)(c+1)) where N is the number of nodes, E is the number of 
edges and c is the number of elementary cycles. The case of undirected graphs is a bit more 
tricky as the union of two elementary cycles with at least one shared edge is also an elementary 
cycle (after removing the shared edges from the union), thus we can expect a lot more cycles 
than for directed graphs where this condition does not hold. It is therefore common to search for 
a cycle base instead, i.e., a set of cycles such that every other cycle can be reproduced from 
selected base cycles by taking their disjoint unions. Since every edge that participates in a cycle 
must also participate in one of the base cycles, finding a cycle base is enough for our purposes. 
Luo and Magee (2011) proposed the opposite of this measure (i.e., the fraction of edges not 
participating in cycles) as a hierarchy measure for directed networks. A big advantage of this 
approach is its simplicity.  
 
Minimum fraction of edges to be removed to make the graph cycle-free 
 
This approach is slightly different from the one called ―fraction of edges participating in cycles‖. 
For instance, consider a graph consisting of two interlocking directed links sharing an edge. In 
this graph, all the edges participate in cycles (hence the previous measure would be 1.0), but 
removing the shared edge would make the graph entirely cycle-free. We call a set of edges 
whose removal makes the graph cycle-free feedback arc set. 
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Fig. 2.6 Illustration of the difference between ―the fraction of edges participating in cycles‖ and the ―fraction of 
edges to be removed to make the graph cycle-free‖. Subfigure a shows a graph where all the edges participate in 
cycles. However, as it can be seen in b, it is enough to remove a single edge (from J to A) to break both cycles 
and obtain a perfect hierarchy. 
 
Note that although Fig. 2.6 shows a directed graph, this measure works just as well for 
undirected graphs– but the number of edges to be removed may be different! For instance, the 
graph with the two rings on the left of Fig. 2.6 becomes cycle-free by removing one single edge 
if the edges are directed, but one has to remove two edges to make it cycle-free in the undirected 
case. 
This measure is very easy to calculate for connected undirected simple graphs. Since the 
graph is connected, the minimum number of edges required to connect N vertices is N-1. Adding 
any extra edge on top of these N-1 edges necessarily creates a cycle, thus the number of edges 
one has to remove from an undirected simple connected graph with N vertices and M edges is M-
N+1, and the fraction of such edges is therefore 1-(N-1)/M. 
For directed graphs, finding a minimum feedback arc set is an NP-hard problem (Healy and 
Nikolov 2013), but heuristic procedures exist to find an approximation. One such procedure is 
the greedy cycle removal algorithm by Eades et al. (1993) Namely: 
 
1. Create an empty ―deque‖ (double-ended queue).  
2. If the graph is empty, we are done.  
3. While there are sink vertices in the graph, remove them one by one and add them to the 
beginning of the deque. 
4. While there are source vertices in the graph, remove them one by one and append them to 
the deque (add them to the end of the deque).  
5. If no sinks and sources remain, find a vertex where the difference between the out-degree 
and the in-degree is as large as possible, remove it from the graph, append it to the deque 
and return to step 2.  
 
At the end of the algorithm, the deque contains a possible ordering of vertices where 
ordinary edges point ―forward‖ in the ordering and feedback arcs point ―backward‖. The 
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cardinality of the feedback arc set found by this heuristic is at most M/2-N/6 where M is the 
number of edges and N is the number of vertices. 
Another heuristic is as follows. Scan each edge of the graph one by one and maintain two 
sets, S and T. In each step, check whether edge e forms a cycle with the edges already in S. If not, 
add e to S, otherwise add e to T. In the end, both S and T are acyclic and the smaller of the two 
sets gives a feedback arc set with at most half of all the edges. More sophisticated 
approximations are to be found in (Even et al. 1995) and (Saab 2001).  
 
For graphs up to a couple of hundred nodes, one can use the following strategy as well: 
 
1. If the graph is undirected, break it down into components, and calculate the sum of M-N+1 
for each component, where M is the number of edges in the component and N is the number 
of vertices. This is the total number of edges to be removed to make the graph cycle-free; the 
fraction follows by a straightforward division. 
2. If the graph is directed, break it down into weakly connected components and estimate the 
number of edges to be removed from each of the components as follows: 
 If the component is acyclic (i.e., it has a topological ordering), no edges have to be removed 
at all.  
 If the component has less than 20 edges, use a brute-force search to find the minimum 
number of edges to be removed to make it cycle-free.  
 Otherwise, find a minimum cut of the component, add the edges of the cut to the feedback 
edge set and proceed recursively with each side of the cut. 
 
Fraction of hierarchy-violating edges 
A hierarchy-violating edge is one that originates in a higher level and terminates in a lower level, 
meaning that someone up in the hierarchy ―reports to‖ someone on the lower level. This is a 
clear violation. Naturally, this measure requires the ranks to be known in advance as it is 
otherwise impossible to decide which edges violate the hierarchy. 
Another, more strict definition of a hierarchy-violating edge is that it is an edge where 
subtracting the rank of the origin from the rank of the target yields a result that is not zero and 
not one. This definition penalizes not only the edges that go ―the wrong way‖ in a hierarchy but 
also the edges that skip levels. 
In the absence of ranks, one has to find the ranking that minimizes the fraction of hierarchy-
violating edges, which leads to a problem that may be familiar from community detection. A 
trivial way to minimize the number of hierarchy-violating edges is to use the same rank for every 
node, assuming that edges between peers (i.e. nodes with the same rank) are allowed. A possible 
solution is to disallow edges between peers, which effectively reproduces the feedback arc set 
problem, since a directed graph minus a minimum feedback arc set is a directed acyclic graph 
which can then be decomposed into layers. Each feedback arc is then a hierarchy-violating edge.  
 
Average expected downstream path length 
 
This measure is based on random walks. More precisely, the expected length of a path a random 
walker is allowed to take on the graph with the following constraints: 
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1. The walker is only allowed to step downstream in the graph, i.e. towards lower layers. A 
path that goes downward in a layered hierarchy is called a downstream path (-hence the 
name of the measure).  
2. The transition matrix of the random walk is a usual right-stochastic matrix derived from 
the weighted adjacency matrix of the graph (loop edges are not allowed).  
3. The random walk terminates as soon as the walker ends up in a sink node or in a node 
that has neighbours in higher layers only.  
 
The measure also requires an a priori layer assignment, and it is an open problem to find the 
optimal assignment given the graph only. When the layers are known, the measure can be 
calculated very easily: one has to proceed recursively from the lowermost layer towards the 
uppermost layer and make use of the following two equations: 
 
1. If a vertex v is a sink, then the expected length of downstream paths from v is zero.  
2. If v is not a sink, the expected length is one more than the expected length of downstream 
paths from its lower-level neighbours, weighted by the probabilities of reaching those 
neighbours from v in a single step. Note that only the expected length of downstream 
paths for vertices in layers lower than v has to be known, therefore, a single sweep from 
lower layers to the uppermost layer is enough.  
 
To make graphs with different numbers of layers comparable, it is advised to normalize this 
measure as follows.  
Suppose that vertex v is at layer l(v) and there are k layers. The maximal value of the 
expected downstream path length originating from v (denoted by h(v)) is then k - l(v). The 
normalized variant of the measure takes the average of h(v)/(k - l(v)) for all non-sink vertices, 
assuming that 0/0 is 0. 
The above overview of the ―further hierarchy measures‖ was composed using the working 
paper by T. Nepusz (2013). 
 
 
2.1.3 Classification of hierarchical networks 
 
The methods overviewed in the previous Sect. (2.1.2) assign a value for each graph, reflecting 
the extent to which the input network is hierarchical. Now we shall reverse the direction, and 
show an algorithm that creates a graph based on an input parameter p (taking values on the [0, 1] 
interval) indicating how hierarchical the output graph should be. p=0 refers to non-hierarchical 
and p close to 1 refers to strongly hierarchical structures. The method was proposed by Mones et 
al. (2012). 
The construction of the graph with tunable levels of hierarchy goes as follows (Fig. 2.7 a): 
 
 A level-value (ℓ) is assigned to every node in a directed tree in the following way: 
o The nodes at the ―bottom-level‖ (that is, the leaves) are assigned ℓ=1. 
o The level-value of the root node is equal to the number of hierarchical levels in 
the tree. (for example ℓ=5 in Fig 2.7a of the root node) 
o All children of a node with level-value ℓ will have ℓ-1 as level-value. 
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 Next a given number of random directed edges are added to the tree according to the 
following rules: 
o 1-p proportion of these edges are added completely randomly by choosing their 
starting point (A) and end-node (B) with probability 1/N (N is the number of nodes 
in the graph). In case there is no directed edge pointing from A to B, such an edge 
is added to the graph.  
o Regarding the rest of the edges (accounting for the p proportion of the ―extra‖ 
edges) they are added only if ℓA> ℓB.  
 
Figure 2.7 b depicts the GRC values (see Sect. 2.1.2) for hierarchical graphs created with the 
above algorithm, for p=0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1.0. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.7 a The different types of edges while constructing a hierarchical graph based on an input parameter p. 
Solid blue edges belong to the original tree used as the backbone of the output graph. Edges pointing downwards 
(green) conserve the hierarchy, horizontal edges (orange) have a slight influence and finally the ones directed 
upwards (marked with red) make strong change in the structure. 
b Distribution of the local reaching centrality (see Sect. 2.1.2) values for adjustable hierarchical networks with 
various p values. Each curve is an average of 1000 networks with N=2000 nodes for <k>=3. Note that from the 
highly random (p=0) to the highly hierarchical (p=1) state the distribution changes continuously and 
monotonously with p. Reproduced from Mones et al. (2012). 
 
Similarly to the problem of measuring hierarchy, the problem of classification of 
hierarchical structures is not trivial either. Next we shall overview a method proposed by 
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Corominas-Murtra et al. (2013) which is based on three expectations towards hierarchical 
systems. These are (i) treeness (ii) feed-forwardness, and (iii) orderability. (See later in more 
details.) 
Using the above three features, a 3D morphospace (―phenotype-space‖) can be defined in 
which the three axes are the tree quantifiable features. Placing real-life hierarchical and random 
null-models into such a coordinate system, fundamental characteristics can be revealed. As it 
turns out, networks do not occupy the entire morphospace, instead they accumulate in four major 
clusters within the large voids, which most probably results from the constraints under which 
they evolve. 
Let‘s define the proper position of a network G(V,E) within the morphospace.  
First, G(V,E)=G is transformed into its corresponding node-weighted condensed graph 
GC(VC, EC)=GC which is an acyclic feed-forward structure where the cyclic modules (strongly 
connected components) of G are replaced by single nodes. Accordingly, in a node-weighted 
condensed graph GC, each node has a weight αi indicating the number of nodes it includes from 
G, the original graph. For example, in Fig. 2.8, subfigure h depicts the node-weighted condensed 
graph GC corresponding to G, the one depicted on subfigure d. In this, node S2 includes 3 nodes 
from G and S1 includes 2. (This method, the localization of strongly connected components, is an 
often used approach to identify subsystems within a graph.) 
Then we calculate the three values using both G and GC. 
 
1. ―Treeness‖, T, taking values on the [-1, 1] interval, captures how unambiguous the ―chain 
of command‖ is within GC. In hierarchical networks, like the one in Fig. 2.8 a and on its 
corresponding node-weighted graph depicted on e, the chain-of-command is unequivocal, 
characterized by positive T values. In case the chain of command is ambiguous, the 
structure is said to be anti-hierarchical, marked by negative T values (Fig. 2.8 b and f). 
Intuitively, this feature is calculated by comparing the diversity of choices one can make 
top-down vs. the uncertainty on the way bottom-up, captured by the concepts forward 
and backward entropies.  
 
2. ―Feed-forwardness‖, F: Since the paths within cyclic modules (like S1 and S2 in Fig. 2.8 
h) violate the downstream order within the graph, they are penalized according to their 
size and position: larger modules closer to the top of G influence more the overall 
structure of G than smaller ones close to the bottom. Accordingly, they introduce larger 
penalty. F is defined on the [0, 1] interval.  
 
3. ―Orderabiliy‖, O, is defined as the fraction of nodes that do not belong to any cycle. 
These nodes are orderable, accordingly, bigger ratio results higher orderability value. O 
takes values from [0, 1].  
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Fig. 2.8 A Visualization of the tree concepts characterizing hierarchical networks: treeness (T), feed-forwardness 
(F) and orderability (O). Based on these tree features, a morphospace can be defined in which the similarities 
and differences (resulting from evolutionary constraints) can be analysed. a A perfectly hierarchical graph is 
tree-like (or pyramidal, T=1) with feed-forward edges (F=1) and orderable nodes (O=1). b In anti-hierarchical 
networks (characterized by negative T values and head downwards pyramidal structures) the chain of command 
is ambiguous. c is non-hierarchical (T=0) and d is a graph with cyclic modules, violating the orderability of the 
nodes. (e-h): the corresponding node-weighted condensed graphs of the networks in the first row, with paths top-
down and bottom-up. (i-l) : the icon representation of the graphs in the first row, along with their TFO values. 
Reproduced from Corominas-Murtra et al. (2013) 
 
Figure 2.9 depicts the location of random null models (white circles) and 125 real networks 
within the morphospace. Since random networks are being built without any selection pressure, 
they are neither hierarchical nor anti-hierarchical, accordingly, they occupy the T≈0 segment.  
The main observation is that the vast majority of real networks fall into four clusters:  
 
i. Gene regulatory networks (plus a protein kinase NW) occupy the first cluster at the top of 
the coordinate system (Fig. 2.9), marked as ―GRN‖. These systems are characterized by 
very high orderabiliy values (O) with variable F values. The broad range of F (feed-
forwardness) is caused by various sized modules near to the top of the networks, 
corresponding to a small fraction of genes, (transcription factors) participating in cycles. 
ii. Electronic circuits and software graphs are strictly feed-forward (F≈1) with orderable 
nodes (O≈1), biased slightly towards negative T values. This cluster (marked as ―TECH‖ 
in Fig. 2.9) is located on the top right edge of the morphospace. 
iii. (ECO) The third cluster is defined by the ecological flow graphs, marked as ―ECO‖ in the 
Fig. 2.9. Their positions within the morphospace reveal a certain degree of pyramidal 
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structure combined with the important role played by loops. This special, separated 
position is consistent with the trophic pyramid mingled with recycling.  
iv. And finally, the fourth cluster is composed of metabolic, neural, linguistic, and some 
social networks (―LANG, MET, NEU‖), embedded within the cloud of random graphs. 
These networks display a large central cycle, much larger than their randomized 
counterparts, which feature is most probably due to the advantage of reusing/recycling 
molecules. 
 
 
 
Fig 2.9 The position of 125 real networks and various random null models within the morphospace defined by 
the coordinates T (treeness), F (feed-forwardness) and O (Orderabiliy). The random networks are white, while 
the real networks are colour coded according to their types listed in the key. The size of the circles is 
proportional to number of nodes the corresponding graph includes. Reproduced from Corominas-Murtra et al. 
(2013)  
 
Two of these clusters (LANG/MET/NEU and TECH) overlap with random networks with 
similar connectivity, suggesting that non-adaptive factors shape the topological nature of these 
graphs. In contrast, the position of the ECO and GRN clusters indicate that the topological 
features of the ecological and gene networks are the resultant of functional constraints. 
 
 
2.2 Visualization techniques  
2.2.1 A general overview  
 
The aim of the various visualization techniques is the same: to illustrate the entire network as a 
single figure in an easily perceptible way, revealing as much information of its hierarchical 
nature / inner structure as possible. Since (real) hierarchical systems are often complex with 
many characteristics, the level to which a visualization technique reflects the main features of a 
network is limited. Different visualization tools highlight different characteristics and different 
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hierarchy types require different visualization tools. There exists no ―best method‖, the 
appropriate technique depends on the specific characteristics we would like to highlight. 
The most simple – and widespread – visualization technique is the pyramid, in which each 
entity is represented by a layer and the higher an entity is in the hierarchy, the higher it is in the 
diagram. Often (for example in case of social pyramids), but not always (e.g., Maslow‘s 
hierarchy), the width of the layer reflects the size of the represented layer. The drawback of this 
technique is that it can reflect only a linear order (a sequence) of the layers, and – in some cases 
– their approximate sizes. In other words, this technique reveals only an order hierarchy of the 
layers, without giving any description about the inner structure of the given system. 
In contrast, graphs are applicable to describe not only order hierarchy, but other hierarchy 
types as well, most importantly flow hierarchy, meanwhile allowing a much more detailed 
visualization of the inner structure of the system as well. Due to these reasons, visualization of 
flow hierarchy is the most commonly used technique to represent hierarchical systems.  
Because of the lack of loops and cycles, the representation of a ―pure‖ hierarchical system 
would be a tree. However, in real-life cases, such systems occur only very rarely. Accordingly, 
trees often correspond to the ideal and/or theoretical case, while graphs that are more complex 
(have cycles, undirected edges, etc.) are better suitable for representing real-life cases. 
This representation is closely connected to the concept of control (or flow) hierarchy, in 
which the entities (which are represented by nodes in the corresponding graph) are organized 
into a system of subordinate-superordinate relations, which correspond to the edges of the graph. 
Accordingly, orders or information flow on the edges (hence the name) from the superior unit(s) 
towards the inferior element(s), while requests and information flow in the opposite direction. 
Typical examples are the ranks in armies, various state and church organizations, corporations, 
etc. 
2.2.2 Techniques reflecting the overall hierarchy level 
 
Let‘ have a graph, representing a (real life or artificial) system. The graph can be large, having 
many communities and sub-communities, therefore difficult to be drawn in a way that is 
reasonably accessible to overview. However, we would like to know how hierarchical the 
original system is, preferably in a visual form. 
The most widely accepted method for visualizing the hierarchical nature of small networks 
is the one proposed by Sugiyama et al. (1981). For such graphs, this technique provides an 
informative and clear hierarchical layout by layering the vertices into horizontal rows in a way 
that the edges are directed downwards. This method is often referred to as ―Layered graph 
drawing‖ or ―hierarchical graph drawing‖ method. 
The main steps are the following (Fig. 2.10): 
(i) Cycle removal (a pre-processing step). If the directed input graph is not acyclic, a 
minimal set of ―reversal edges‖ has to be identified and reversed in order to obtain an 
acyclic digraph. (Identifying such a minimal edge-set is an NP-complete problem.) 
(These reversed edges, as well as other changes within the graph will be restored in a 
later step into their original state.) 
(ii) Layer assignment. Partitioning the vertex set of the graph into layers in a way that each 
edge is directed from a higher level towards a lower one, with the following properties: 
a. the number of layers is kept small 
b. as few edges span large number of layers as possible 
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c. the assignment of nodes into layers is balanced. 
(iii) Insertion of “dummy vertices”.  ―Long‖ edges (edges spanning multiple layers) are 
chopped up into a series of shorter ones by inserting so called ―dummy vertices‖ into the 
graph. After this step each edge will connect nodes on adjacent layers. 
(iv) Edge concentration (optional step): The aim of this step is to reduce the number of edge 
crossings and the edge density between adjacent levels. It might reduce the number of 
dummy vertices as well, but, as important drawbacks, it may increase the number of 
layers and it also modifies the graph.  
(v) Vertex ordering (or ―crossing minimization‖ or ―crossing reduction‖ step). The nodes 
within the layers are permuted in a way that the numbers of edge-crossings are minimized 
between the adjacent layers. 
(vi) x-Coordinate assignment: The aim of this step is to position the nodes (that is, assigning 
them an x coordinate) within each layer in a way that the edges become as straight as 
possible, and the nodes are centred with respect to their neighbours. This positioning 
should be consistent with the permutation applied in the previous step.  
(vii) Final step: Changes that have been introduced to the graph in previous steps are reversed 
so that the edges return into their original state:  
a. edges reversed in the ―cycle removal‖ (first) step are returned into their original 
direction 
b. dummy vertices that have been inserted in step (iii) are removed from the graph and 
the corresponding ―long‖ edges are drawn back in a way that avoids intersections and 
crossings. This might be done by drawing the edges as polygonal chains or spline 
curves.  
 
For a detailed analysis and description of this method see also (Healy and Nikolov 2013). 
Although this method is very popular for small networks, it has some serious drawbacks as well, 
which become especially important for large graphs:  
 
• for bigger networks (graphs with more than a few hundred nodes) the generated layout 
becomes difficult to overview/interpret;  
• the steps are NP-complete or NP-hard, which makes the usage of several different 
heuristics necessary and thus the results become less well-defined. 
• independently of the hierarchical nature of the given network, the method provides a 
hierarchical layout which is often misleading;  
• the meaning of the levels is not defined; 
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Fig. 2.10 The main steps of the Sugiyama algorithm. It is hard to see the hierarchical structure of the input graph a, 
whereas it is clearly visible on the output graph e. This method is appropriate for relative small graphs (up to a few 
hundred nodes). Reproduced from Healy and Nikolov (2013) 
 
Next, we discuss a method proposed by Mones et al. (2012) that solves the above problems 
and is easily applicable even for complex large networks (See Fig. 2.11). 
The algorithm of the proposed method is as follows:  
 
1. Rank the nodes according to their local reaching centrality value, CR(i), where CR(i) is 
the ratio of nodes that can be reached from the focal node i, reflecting ―impact‖ of i on 
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other nodes (see also Sect. 2.1.3). (Importantly, from the viewpoint of the algorithm, 
instead of CR(i) , other local quantities can be used as well.)  
 
2. Start to add nodes to the first, bottom-most level of the layout in an increasing order 
regarding their CR(i) values, until L <  G. Here L is the standard deviation of the CR(i) 
values within the actual level, whereas G is that within the entire graph.  is an 
adjustable parameter, defining the ―resolution‖ of the levels.) 
 
3. Once L   G, start a new level. 
 
4. Repeat 2nd  and 3rd steps until every node is put in levels. (Step 2 ensures that nodes with 
similar CR(i) values will be on the same level.) 
 
5. In order to get a nice horizontal arrangement, align the centre of mass of each level above 
one other, that is, to the same vertical line. 
 
6. The levels are arranged vertically in a way that the distances between adjacent levels are 
proportional to the logarithm of the differences of the averages inside the certain levels: 
(Yℓ+1-Yℓ)  ln [CRℓ+1 - CRℓ]. (Yℓ is the vertical position of level ℓ whereas CRℓ is the 
average of the CR(i)  values within level ℓ.) 
Next, set the vertical distances of the levels in a way that they become proportional to the 
differences between their average xi values. Set the smallest distance to the same value as 
the horizontal distance between two adjacent nodes. Finally, set the distances to be 
proportional to the logarithm of the original differences in a way that the height of the 
graph is kept unchanged. 
 
For large graphs,  tunes the vertical extension of the layout  
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Fig 2.11 The main steps of the visualization process. Firstly the layout is computed, based on the local reaching 
centrality, CR(i), values (top right). Next, the levels are separated with a logarithmic ratio and then each layout is 
scaled into the unit square (bottom left). Finally, the rescaled layouts are plotted in the unit square with the 
obtained node-density (bottom right, see also the colour bar as well). In the heat maps, the colour scale shows 
log(log((x,y)+1)+1), where (x,y) is the average density of the ensemble. Reproduced from Mones et al. 
(2012). 
 
Figure 2.12 shows the resultant of this method for (a) Erdős-Rényi, (b) scale-free, and (c) 
directed tree type of graphs.  
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.12 Visualization of the three network types studied in Sect. 2.1.3, based on their local reaching centrality 
values. a An Erdős–Rényi (ER) graph, b a scale-free (SF) network, and c a directed tree with random branching 
number between 1 and 5. For all three graphs N=1000 with the parameter ε set to 2/N. In case of the ER and the 
SF graphs <k>=3. Reproduced from Mones et al. (2012) 
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3 Observations and measurements  
3.1 Animal groups 
3.1.1 Dominance  
 
From the viewpoint of an individual, both solitary and social life style has advantages and 
disadvantages too, mainly defined by the access to resources, such as food or mates. A solitary 
animal does not have to share anything with others, but such an individual is constantly exposed 
to a much higher level of danger regarding predators and also faces difficulties in finding mates 
for reproduction. Living in groups is safer with respect to predator avoidance, ensures the 
possibility of reproduction and creates an environment in which decision-making is more optimal 
because of the information transmission among the members. At the same time, it raises 
competition among the members for the resources and increases the probability of disease and 
parasite transmissions. 
If, on the whole, for a given species the ratio of advantages/disadvantages is higher in case 
of living in groups than in case of a solitary life style (that is, ensures a higher chance for 
survival for the individuals), the animals will knit into groups. In such case, effective regulating 
mechanisms are needed in order to reduce the level of aggression among the members triggered 
by the competition. 
The evolutionary solution for this problem is the emergence of dominance hierarchy, a 
mechanism whose main purpose is to regulate the access to resources. The mechanism is simple: 
higher ranked individuals have primacy compared to their lower level mates. As one advances in 
the evolutionary tree, the structure of the dominance hierarchy gets more and more pronounced 
and complex, accompanied by more and more sophisticated strategies by which individuals try to 
get higher and higher ranks. When it comes to chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, our closest living 
relatives, we find that they use such elaborated methods in their everyday fights for positions, 
which, even just a few decades ago, was believed to be practised only by humans. Such tools, 
among others include coalition formation, manipulation, and exchange of social favours or 
adaptation of rational strategies (de Waal 2007). 
No surprise that – being embedded into such an evolutionary process – humans are very 
sensitive for hierarchical positions as well. The unappeasable longing for getting higher and 
higher in the hierarchy is a basic human characteristic as well (Weisfeld and Beresford 1982). 
From a physiological point of view, the mechanisms determining the rank of an individual are 
very similar in primates and humans (Sapolsky 2005) – and in mammals in general: for example 
the level of testosterone in the blood, the principal male sex hormone, is found to be related to 
the rank: in case of various monkey species, higher testosterone level was measured in higher 
ranked individuals than in lower level animals (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1990). Similar correspondence 
was found in humans as well: in an experiment, the testosterone level of young male tennis 
players found to be rising in case of victory, but falling in case of defeat, whereas no change was 
detectable during training. In another experiment, the testosterone level of medical students was 
measured, before and after exam. For those who passed the exam successfully, the level of the 
hormone arose, but for those who failed, it fell (Mazur and Lamb 1980). The level of the 
testosterone hormone and the inclination of behaving dominantly form a positive feedback loop 
as one intensifies the other. 
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The other hormone that constantly pops up in relation with dominance rank – primarily in 
connection with primates – is the glucocorticoid steroid hormone, also known as stress hormone. 
During the last decades many attempts have been made to study their relation, but the picture is 
still not clear (at least in stratified mammal societies) since various studies report contradictory 
findings. According to the original view, subordinate individuals must be exposed to a much 
higher level of stress than their higher-ranking mates, and thus their stress hormone level is 
higher as well. However, measurements revealed that they are exactly the higher ranking 
individuals who have higher cortisol level in their blood (Muller and Wrangham 2004). Other 
studies found support to the original assumption, namely that the glucocorticoid secretion is 
stronger in lower ranking individuals in general, from which the only exception is the alpha male 
in the very top of the hierarchy, whose cortisol level is the highest in the whole group (Gesquiere 
et al. 2011). Furthermore, the correlation between the level of stress hormone and high rank 
found to be the strongest during periods of social instability, which is no surprise since during 
transitions in the hierarchical structure it is the highest ranking individuals who are exposed to 
the highest level of aggression (Sapolsky 1983). The observed differences might be due to the 
variations of the social organizations in different species and populations (Sapolsky 2005).  As 
such, Creel (2001) identifies the decisive factor determining the relation in the way group 
members help each other in breeding the offsprings: in those species, among which cooperatively 
breeding is common, the rank and the hormone level is in direct proportion, while in other 
species it is in inverse proportion, see Fig.3.1. (Cooperative breeding means that offsprings are 
taken care of not only by their parents, but also by other group members.) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 Relation between the level of stress hormone and rank. Among species with cooperative breeding 
(purple bars on the left) the level of basal glucocorticoid (GC) is significantly higher in dominant individuals 
than in subordinates (D>S) in contrast with other species (yellow bars on the right), where the relation is vice 
versa. Reproduced from Creel (2001) 
 
 
Notably, permanently being exposed to high stress hormone levels has a serious (negative) 
effect on the individual‘s health too, especially on the cardiovascular, adrenocortical, 
reproductive and immune systems (which complaints are often referred to as ―stress-related 
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diseases‖). For a review on the relation between rank and health in primate societies see 
(Sapolsky 2005). 
In humans, the phenomenon that there is a strong correlation between the socioeconomic 
status and the appearance of various stress-related diseases has been known for a long time and 
was well documented (Adler et al. 1994). Although the socioeconomic status (among humans) 
does not cover exactly the concept of rank in the dominance hierarchy, it is still a good 
approximation to it (Sapolsky 2004), and, more importantly, easier to measure – which explains 
why human studies use mostly this concept. 
These findings refer to the relationship between the physiological state of an individual and 
its rank in the dominance hierarchy. As we shall see in the upcoming chapters, in human 
societies, besides the dominance hierarchy, another type of hierarchical structure emerges as 
well, what we shall call ―cultural hierarchy‖. 
 
Measuring dominance 
 
Probably the best known hierarchy type is dominance hierarchy according to which individuals 
belonging to the same group regulate their access to natural resources such as food, mating 
partners, nesting locations or a safe lair. While establishing the ranking system, members of the 
group interact, often aggressively, in the form of repeated fights and threats. The result of each 
encounter is remembered by both parties and in case of many species by other group members as 
well. But after the order is set, subordinates will give way to their superiors without further fights 
or threats. The fundamental advantage of this arrangement is that it minimizes the aggression 
within the group since individuals do not engage in fights continually, only when creating or 
altering the dominance structure. In order to maintain such a structure, the individuals have to 
recognise each other and they also have to remember their mates along with the outcomes of the 
fights. In other words, they have to be able to create and maintain a mental model of the social 
structure within their group. Most probably this is the reason why it appears only at certain point 
of evolution, which is, according to our present knowledge, is at the point when fishes appear 
(Unfortunately the scope of the present book cannot cover the amazing organizational 
mechanisms driving the societies of social insects (Hölldobler and Wilson 2008); hence, in the 
followings we shall focus mainly on the dominance structures determining the social lives of the 
most various vertebrate species.) 
The most simple dominance structure is called despotism. In such an order one individual 
rules over all the others who, on the other hand, have no rank distinctions among each other. For 
example bumblebees maintain such a structure, as it was recognised and described by Swiss 
entomologist Pierre Huber in 1802 in a study which is now considered to be the first modern 
research on the field of dominance hierarchy (Huber 1802). However, real interest started to 
show only more than a century later when Thorleif Schjelderup-Ebbe described the dominance 
structure (which he called the ―pecking order‖) of hens (Gallus domesticus) in his PhD 
dissertation of 1922. Later this expression, ―pecking order‖ was extended to the dominance 
relations of other kinds of birds too, while by now it is often used in a general sense as a 
synonym for dominance hierarchy. 
Since then this topic has yield a lot of attention from biologists, and by now it has a vast 
literature. However, in the past decades scholars from other fields have also become interested in 
the formation of dominance hierarchies, most prominently economists, computer scientists, 
theoretical biologists and physicists whose aim has been twofold: (i) to give an account of the 
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self-organizational process that is behind the formation of dominance hierarchies (in animal and 
human groups as well), and (ii) to develop techniques allowing the hierarchical relations among 
group members to be measured.  
When trying to come up with such techniques, one immediately runs into the following 
problem: how should dominance be quantified, ―measured‖? A traditional way to overcome this 
problem is to sit for a long time in a (preferably hidden) observation point and watch the social 
life of the observed group, meanwhile making as precise record of their inter-individual 
interactions as possible. With this approach many fascinating results have been reached, among 
which the best known ones are probably the ones related to the observations of primate societies, 
most notably chimpanzee groups (de Waal 2007). Probably the biggest benefit of this approach 
is that any kind of interaction can be recorded (who eats first, who sleeps where, who ―beats up‖ 
whom, how the conflicts are being solved, etc.). However, this technique also requires an 
enormous amount of time, special conditions (ensuring continuous observation of the group in its 
natural environment, or in an environment in which the human impact is as limited as possible), 
and the ability to recognize all the individuals with high confidence within the observed group. 
These are requirements that are not easy to fulfil.  
Most recent techniques aim to automate somehow the observations: to take video records 
and analyse the results later with various computer programs (Ballerini et al. 2008, Pérez-
Escudero et al. 2014), to put small GPS devices on the individuals and record their motion with 
these equipment (Ákos et al. 2014, Nagy et al. 2010, Nagy et al. 2013, see Fig. 3.2), or an even 
more recent technology is to combine the data recorded with various sensors (Gerencsér et al. 
2013).  
The biggest disadvantage of the video records is that the individuals within the group has to 
be identified later (at least if the inter-individual interactions are to be analysed). This problem 
turns out to be extremely difficult, primarily on videos recording animals in their natural 
environment. For example Ballerini et al. (2008) recorded the free flight of starling flocks 
(counting 2,600 individuals) and restored the 3D positions of the birds using stereometric and 
computer vision techniques within the framework of the ―Starflag‖ project, lasting from 2005 to 
2007.  
A way to overcome the problem of individual recognition on video records is to put some 
kind of identification marks on the individuals. However, this method can be used only in groups 
counting top most a few dozens of individuals. For example Nagy et al. (2013) marked pigeons 
with a colour-bar (a unique combination of three, well-distinguishable colours on the back of 
each bird) and recorded their activity from above (see Fig. 3.2). In such a way, ―only‖ the colour 
bar recognition had to be solved in an automated way. (Which also turned out to be a highly non-
trivial task, since colours faded on the back of the animals, the birds covered each other from 
time to time, the efficiency of the recognition depended strongly on the actual lighting 
conditions, etc. However, even with such difficulties, by using the ―colour-bar technique‖, the 
problem of individual recognition is still easier to solve than without any crutch.) 
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Fig. 3.2 The ―colour bar technique‖. A snapshot of the processed video sequence. The original video records the 
feeding-queuing activity of a group of homing pigeons. Each bird is marked with a unique combination of three 
colours (a ―colour bar‖) serving as an individual code for a computer program designed to identify the individuals 
automatically, and process their behaviour. Circles divide the different activity regions: birds marked with red colour 
in the central circle identified as the ones feeding, individuals marked with blue identified as the ones queuing, and 
pigeons out of the external circle are identified as ‖not interested‖. Reproduced from Nagy et al. (2013). 
 
Pérez-Escudero et al. (2014) introduced a method which is based on individual recognition 
as well, but instead of putting an artificial mark on the individuals, an algorithm (called 
idTracker) was designed to extract a characteristic fingerprint from each animal which are then 
used to identify the individuals throughout the video. This technology prevents propagation of 
errors, and the correct identities can be maintained basically indefinitely. The algorithm has been 
tested on fish, flies, ants and mice, and was able to distinguish animals even when humans could 
not. 
 
 
3.1.2 Leadership in motion  
 
As mentioned in Chap. 2, hierarchy is context dependent, that is, the same group often organizes 
itself into different structures depending on the actual task. In the context of animals leadership 
the hierarchical structure emerges during collective motion. It differs from dominance hierarchy 
at least in two fundamental ways: (i) followers follow the leader in an unprompted manner, and 
(ii) in case there is a target, the emerging hierarchy can be related to the way in which the 
information flows within a group.  
Due to the recent technological developments, data on a larger scale and with increasing 
precision have been gathered within this field of research giving the topic a special importance. 
The relation describing ―who leads whom‖ in a group defines a stand-alone, quite well 
measurable hierarchical structure (assuming that the one who is leading is the ―dominant‖ one 
and the one being led is the subordinate individual). This is called the leadership network, which 
is not directly related to dominance hierarchy (Nagy et al. 2010). Rather, it is probably an 
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interaction among dominance, kinship, the inner state of the individuals (like hunger or fear) and 
some outer conditions. In this section we shall overview some quantitative results on leadership.  
From the viewpoint of leadership (and hierarchy, in general) a group whose members are 
able to identify each other on an individual level differs fundamentally from groups in which the 
members are basically identical, that is, they cannot recognize each other. In the latter case, the 
group might reach a collective decision regarding, for example, the direction of motion either 
with or without a leader. In case when there is no leader, the decision can be made based on 
some very simple mechanism such as direction alignment or mean value calculation, whereas in 
case when there is a leader, (but still no individual recognition) leadership is still not a well-
defined stable structure, but rather a temporal, continually changing network: it is based on 
temporal differences such as actual level of hunger, fear, spawning inducement, etc. or some 
pertinent information regarding predator or food location. 
The first case (no individual recognition and no leader) can be described accurately with a 
model proposed by Vicsek et al. (1995). In this approach self-propelled particles move with a 
fixed velocity on a 2D surface while aligning their direction of motion to that of others being 
within a given distance.  
When leadership emerges from differences in the inner states of the members (and there is 
still no individual recognition) can be described with a model suggested by Couzin et al. (2005). 
In this paper they have shown how a few informed individuals can lead the entire group in which 
the individuals do not know which of them (if any) has information. According to the model, 
even if the portion of the informed individuals is small, the group as a whole can achieve high 
accuracy regarding the proper direction towards the food location. In fact, the larger the group is, 
the smaller the portion of informed individuals is needed.  
Entirely different is the case when group members are able to identify each other on an 
individual level. Most mammals (and some birds, like pigeons) are like this, enabling the 
emergence of more stable hierarchical leadership structures. According to the biological 
observations, leadership still depends strongly on the actual inner state of the animals (Fischhoff 
et al. 2007), but, at the same time, from the point of the motion of the group, dominance 
hierarchy may play a fundamental role as well. 
To study this question, Sárová et al. (2010) GPS devices recorded the motion of 15 cows 
belonging to the same herd for a period of three weeks. According to their findings, foraging 
motions and short-distance travels are not lead by a particular individual, but rather they are 
influenced in a graded manner: the higher position is occupied by an individual in the herd‘s 
hierarchy, the bigger influence it exerted on the collective motion. Other observations revealed 
that Rhesus macaques prefer to join either related or high-ranking individuals, whereas Tonkean 
macaques exhibited no specific order at departure (Sueur and Petit 2008). In their review paper 
on this topic Petit and Bon (2010) proposed that the process of collective decision making 
(regarding the collective motion of a group) can be interpreted as a combination of two kinds of 
rules: (i) an ―individual-based‖, covering the differences in the inner states of the animals, such 
as hunger, physiology, energetic state, knowledge, spatial position within the group, position in 
the group‘s affiliation network, hierarchical rank, etc. and (ii) ―self-organization‖, referring to the 
inter-individual interactions among group members.  
In order to yield a detailed insight into the leader-follower relationships in a network of a 
flock of homing pigeons, Nagy et al. (2010) equipped ultra-light GPS devices on members of a 
flock of 10 birds. In such a way they obtained high precision data of the trajectories which then 
were analysed using a variety of correlation functions inspired by approaches commonly used in 
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the field of statistical physics. In particular, they analysed the pairwise interactions on the basis 
of the characteristic delay times between the direction changes (―turns‖) of the birds. Using this 
method they have revealed a dynamically changing, but well-defined hierarchy (leadership 
network) within the flock (Fig. 3.3). According to this study, the average spatial position of a 
bird within the flock correlates with its hierarchical rank.  
 
 
Fig. 3.3 The analysis of the flight of a flock of homing pigeon, recorded with ultra-light GPS devices. a A 2-
minute segment from a free flight restored from the GPS data log. Dots and triangles mark every 1s and 5s, 
respectively. Triangles point in the direction of motion. Different letters and colours refer to different pigeons. b 
The leadership network reflecting a single flock flight shown in a. The arrows point from the leader towards the 
follower. The values on edges mark the time delay (in seconds) in the two birds‘ motion. Reproduced from 
(Nagy et al. 2010) 
 
 
The relationship between the spatial position of an individual within a moving group and its 
effect on the movement of others is highlighted by Schaerf et al. (2016) as well. By studying 
moving pairs of fish they found that those being in the front have greater mean changes in their 
speed and are less likely to move towards their partner than vice versa. Furthermore, the pair 
moves faster when the front position is occupied by the one who usually leads the pair.  
Furthermore, many animal species live in ―multilevel modular societies‖ in which smaller 
groups of closely related individuals form more coherent communities which are connected in a 
more loosely connected way creating aggregations on a given level. Among others, primates, 
elephants, whales and horses live in such ―embedded‖ societies (For the embedded hierarchical 
structure present in human societies see Sect. 3.2.3). Ozogány and Vicsek (2015) studied the 
collective motion of a herd of Przewalski horses consisting of many harems (see Fig. 3.4) and 
found that this group structure has an effect on the collective motion of the herd as well, since 
the leadership network itself is modular and hierarchical: there is a leadership hierarchy within 
the dense sub-groups (or harems, in case of horses), and there is a hierarchy among the harems.  
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Fig. 3.4 The motion of a herd of Przewalski horses (n≈150): hierarchy in hierarchy. Different harems, identified 
by the cohesive motion of its members, are marked by different colours. The white arrows indicate the leadership 
relations among harems: they point from the leader towards the follower sub-group. Reproduced from Ozogany 
and Vicsek (2015). 
 
However, these studies do not shed light on the following fundamental question: the so 
called ―individual-based‖ traits, such as navigational ability or spatial position within the group 
are a cause or a consequence of leading? In other words: do they govern the self-organizing 
processes or are they the consequence of leadership, arising through another mechanism? 
In order to address such question, Pettit et al. (2015) conducted measurements aiming to 
understand how individual differences structure a flock and affect the information transfer among 
the birds, and, importantly, how the leader/follower role affects the learning of navigational 
skills. In the experiment, the homing flights of groups of adding up to 40 homing pigeons were 
tracked using GPS devices with a log rate of 10 Hz. The ―level of the leadership‖ for each bird 
was defined based on the directional correlation delay time, the method introduced by Nagy et al. 
(2010).  
According to the study, leadership hierarchies can arise from differences in the birds‘ typical 
speeds. They also found that leaders learn faster and become better navigators, even if leadership 
initially did not originate from navigational ability. In other words, individual differences which 
originally concerned purely physical abilities (speed) with time turned into individual differences 
regarding cognitive capacities (navigational skills). Figure 3.5 depicts this phenomenon: Speed 
did not correlate with homing efficiency before the group flight, but faster individuals did tend to 
gradually become leaders during the collective flight. After the flight these fast pigeons become 
more efficient as well (their navigational skills improved). This was the first time such a 
mechanism was reported. 
The study also suggests that leadership might be an inevitable consequence of 
heterogeneous characteristics among individuals within a self-organized group. Furthermore, the 
role that an individual assumes during collective motion might have a far-reaching effect on the 
development of its abilities regarding how it learns about the environment and uses social 
information. 
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Fig. 3.5 Solo homing efficiency and speed compared to leadership. Each dot represents the mean value 
belonging to a bird, with different symbols for the different groups. Fit lines correspond to linear mixed models 
with group as a random factor. The estimated regression for the fixed effect, if it is significant, is black, or grey if 
it is not significant, as judged from a likelihood-ratio test against a model without that fixed effect. Dashed 
coloured lines show the random effects of the groups on slope and intercept. Reproduced from Pettit et al. (2015)  
 
 
In an ingenious study, Boos et al. (2014) conducted an experiment to test that (i) whether in 
case of humans, collective motion and coordination can emerge from applying merely simple 
local rules, as it is believed to be the case in animal groups, (ii) whether an informed minority 
can lead an uninformed majority to the minority's target, and if so, (iii) how the minority exerts 
its influence? 
In order to hinder all sorts of communications (conscious and unconscious), except for the 
reading of the movement of others, subjects were playing via their avatars in a multi-client 
computer game. In order to activate to two basic local rules, ―cohesion‖ and ―alignment‖ without 
direct instructions, a minority of the players were rewarded higher in case of reaching a pre-
defined target, while the players belonging to the uninformed majority were rewarded lower, but 
equally. (―Cohesion‖ was one of the local rules expressing that the individuals are attracted 
towards their neighbours‘ positions within a local range, and ―alignment‖ was the other, 
expressing that the individuals align their speed and direction within this range to that of their 
neighbours.) They found that (i) directed group motion can emerge from simple local rules in 
case of humans as well, just as in case of animal groups, (ii) within this context, an informed 
minority is able to lead the group to its target, and (iii) a minority can lead the group effectively 
if their members are among the first to make a move, with similar initial directions. 
 
3.1.3 Leadership versus dominance 
 
The assumption that dominant individuals are the ones who at the same time lead the group, is 
very persuasive and intuitive. However, as mentioned in the previous section (Sect. 3.1.2), 
leadership hierarchy and dominance hierarchy are not related to each other in such a 
straightforward manner. Rather, these hierarchies seem to coexist within the same group without 
creating any kind of conflict: when it comes to collective travel those will lead the group who 
have better navigation skills (Nagy et al. 2010) or better information (Couzin et al. 2005), and 
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when it comes to feeding, mating, etc., relations defined by the dominance hierarchy will prevail 
(Nagy et al. 2013). 
The dominance hierarchy and the leadership hierarchy were compared in a more systematic 
way in a flock of homing pigeons, consisting of ten individuals, by Nagy et al. (2013). The two 
hierarchies were found to be different from each other (See Fig. 3.6 b and c and Fig. 3.7). 
Dominance (pecking order, depicted on subfigure 3.6 b) is known to be correlated to aggression 
and access to food, based on some individual features such as physical strength, in order to 
strangulate the violence to a low level within the flock. At the same time, the appearance of the 
stable leadership network during flights is likely to be due to a different set of individual 
competences. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.6 The comparison of the (b) dominance and the (c) leadership networks in a flock of homing pigeons. a 
Releasing the pre-trained homing pigeons from their loft. The small white bag on the back of the bird holds the 
ultra-light, high-precision GPS device (Courtesy of Zs. Ákos). b The pecking order (dominance hierarchy) and c 
the leadership network. Directed edges point from the leader towards the follower. The width of the arrow 
corresponds to the strength of the interaction. Nodes are ordered vertically according to the rank in the hierarchy, 
with the dominant ones on the top. The two hierarchies are different fundamentally. Reproduced from Nagy et 
al. (2013). 
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Fig. 3.7 Adjacency matrices of the mixed graph representation containing both undirected and directed edges for 
each interaction type (FQ in A, AA in B, PO in C, and GFL in D). The 10 × 10 matrices on the left side of each 
panel show the data for the groups A, B, and C (from Top to Bottom, respectively), and the 30 × 30 matrix contains 
data for the group of 30. Colour indicates the type of the edge: red: directed edge pointing from dominant/leader (in 
the row) to the subordinate/follower (in the column); blue: directed edge, reverse direction of a red edge; green: 
undirected edge for mutual interaction; white: no edge. In each matrix the individuals were ordered according to the 
NormDS scores of that interaction. Reproduced from Nagy et al. (2013). 
 
Using similar techniques, namely the pairwise directional correlation analysis of high-
resolution spatio-temporal GPS trajectory data, Ákos et al. (2014) studied the collective motion 
of six dogs belonging to the same household during more than a dozen of 30 to 40 minutes 
unleashed walks, accompanied by their owner (see Fig. 3.8). During the walks, dogs adjust their 
trajectory to that of the owner, but they time to time run away and then turn back to her in a loop. 
On a shorter time scale, the leader-follower roles in a given pair were changing significantly, 
whereas on a longer timescale a consistent leadership structure was manifested. 
The network constructed from these leader-follower relations is hierarchical, in which the 
position of a given dog correlates with the rank (dominance), age, trainability, controllability, 
and aggression. (These values were derived from personality questionnaires.) According to these 
measures, there are some personality traits which tend to characterize the leader (dominant) 
dogs: they were found to be more controllable, trainable, aggressive, and also to be the older 
ones.  
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Fig. 3.8 The collective motion of dogs (belonging to the same household) is influenced by the underlying social 
structure and by differences in the personalities. a The unleashed walks of six dogs belonging to the same 
household, accompanied by their owner. During these walks high-resolution spatio-temporal GPS trajectory data 
were collected and then analysed pairwise. b The basis of the analysis was the directional delay time, shown on 
the arrows. The directed links point from the direction of the leader towards the follower. On the lines, the upper 
values belong to the time delays in seconds whereas the lower values indicate the portion that the leader of that 
pair was actually leading. All the dogs were ‗Vizsla‘, except for the one marked with ―M‖, which was a mixed-
breed. This dog did not participate in the ―vizsla-network‖. c Dominance network of the dogs, derived from a 
questionnaire. The arrows point from the direction of the dominant individual towards the subordinate one. The 
colours represent the context of the dominance: red: barking, orange: licking the mouth, green: eating and blue: 
fighting. Reproduced f rom Ákos et al. (2014) 
 
 
 
3.1.4 Collective decision-making  
 
Animals living in groups continually face problems that require collective decision making, such 
as when and where to rest or to forage, how to defend themselves from predators, how to 
navigate towards a distant target, etc. The personal notion of the group members depends on 
many factors, like information, experience or inner state, such as hunger or exhaustion. Many 
theoretical studies focus on the cost/benefit ratio from the viewpoint of the group members, since 
if the individuals differ in their preferred outcome (and usually they do defer), some individuals 
will have to pay higher ―consensus cost‖ than others. (―Consensus cost‖ is the cost paid by the 
animal by foregoing its preferred behaviour in order to defer to the common decision (King et al. 
2008)).  
The first studies addressing the problem of collective decision making mainly focussed on 
two basic types, both from theoretical and from an experimental point of view. In a despotic 
situation one or a few individuals make the decision, while in an egalitarian (or democratic) 
situation the members contribute to the final outcome to about the same degree. In nature, both 
types have been observed. On one hand, both theoretical and experimental studies show that the 
egalitarian decision-making process has a smaller average consensus cost than the despotic one 
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(Conradt and Roper 2003), on the other hand, despotic decision-making approach can increase 
the efficiency of a group (Couzin et al. 2011). 
More recently, along with the technical developments applied by the researchers in order to 
study the collective decision-making techniques, there have been some interesting observations 
in which egalitarian and despotic methods were alternating according to the circumstances. 
Using high-precision GPS data on pairs of pigeons, Bíró et al. (2006) studied the behaviour of 
the birds in case of conflict in the preferred flight direction. If the difference was small (smaller 
than a certain critical threshold) then the birds averaged their directions (egalitarian decision 
making), but if the difference rose above the threshold, either one of them became the leader or 
the pair split (despotic case). 
Strandburg-Peshkin et al. (2015) identified similar decision-making methods among wild 
baboons. They also recorded the movement of the group members with high precision GPS 
devices over the course of the troop‘s daily activity. Baboons too, do not follow dominant 
individuals, rather the majority of the initiators (those starting off in a certain direction). When 
two groups of initiators (with similar size) heading in different directions, the followings depend 
on the angle between the motions: in case the angle is small (less than around 90°), the animals 
compromise (choose a direction in between), but in case the angle is large, they choose one 
direction over the other, randomly. 
Importantly, these animal species live in highly hierarchical social structures, yet – 
according to the above studies – their collective decisions emerge via shared ―democratic‖ 
process using simple rules. 
In an interesting experiment Couzin et al. (2011) studied the role of uninformed individuals 
(individuals without any preferences regarding the direction) when two groups of initiators with 
different preferred directions were influencing the group motion. Their main question was that 
under what conditions – if any – a strongly opinionated and self-interested minority can exert its 
influence on the entire group. In the experiments they used a fish species, golden shiner, whose 
individuals‘ motion can be predicted with high accuracy by a model using some simple rules: (a) 
avoidance of collision, (b) attraction and (c) alignment (Couzin et al. 2005). The first rule, 
avoidance, has the higher priority. In case others are not detected within a certain region, the 
individual will tend to become attracted towards and aligned with its nearest neighbours within a 
local interaction range. Using the experimental set-up depicted in Fig. 3.9, the trajectories of the 
individual fish can be recorded precisely.  
Some of the fish were trained to be attracted towards the blue target, some to be attracted 
towards the yellow target (to which the shiners exhibited a pre-existing bias), and some 
individuals did not have direction preference at all. Among the trained fish, the strength of the 
preferences was also manipulated. When all the individuals were trained to be attracted towards 
either the blue or the yellow target, the results were in accordance to the expectations: if the 
strength of the majority preference was at least as big as the minority preference then the group 
reached the majority-preferred target with a higher probability. By increasing the strength of the 
preference in the minority group above the preference-strength of the majority group, the 
minority was gaining control over the group behaviour. 
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Fig. 3.9 The experiment conducted by Couzin et al. (2011). a An image from an experimental video with 6 and 5 
trained, and 10 untrained individuals. b The model describing the trajectories of the group members predicts a 
sharp transition from a minority- to a majority-controlled outcome as the density of uninformed individuals is 
increased. These simulations are in qualitative agreement with the observed behaviour. Reproduced from Couzin 
et al. (2011). 
 
The most interesting results were obtained by introducing uninformed individuals into the 
above setup, namely, when the group was under the influence of a strongly opinionated minority 
adding the uninformed individuals to the group returned the control to the numerical majority. 
As their number increased, this effect reached a maximum and then slowly began to diminish. 
This study provided interesting new data for the often observed and widely believed argument 
that groups with members who are poorly informed or do not have any preferences about the 
decision to be made are particularly vulnerable to manipulations of determined and self-
interested minorities (the latter being on the top of the knowledge-based hierarchy).  
Most of the studies analyse the process of collective decision-making from an informational 
point of view, in which individuals make decisions based on their (personal or social) data 
merely. As Miller et al. (2013) points out, during this process the effort to maintain group 
cohesion plays a fundamental role as well. Another basic factor in collective decision making – 
apart from the knowledge, influence and group cohesion – is the structure of the communication 
network defining the way information is spread among the members. A communication network 
is considered to be effective if it ensures that information can spread among the entire group via 
a minimum number of connections.  
By comparing data gathered from 24 species, Pasquaretta et al. (2014) found correlation 
between the neocortex ratio and the efficiency of the communication network. Both modularity 
(showing how strongly the group is clustered) and centralization (the ratio of central individuals) 
found to be inversely related to the efficiency of the network, from which they concluded that 
those species which are more ―tolerant‖ have more efficient networks. 
As it turns out, leadership, and the way members of various social animal species achieve 
collective decisions is based on many factors, such as information, actual physiological state, 
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dominance, navigational competence, etc. The resulting leadership network is a complex, 
multiple level hierarchical structure. 
Motivated by the above findings, a computational model was created to identify the optimal 
competence‖ and pliancy distributions within groups facing problems that had to be solved 
collectively (Zafeiris and Vicsek 2013). In the following part we shall discuss this model along 
with the results. In our interpretation, ―competence‖ is the ability needed to solve the given task 
(for example navigational skill in case of collective flight), and ―pliancy‖ expresses the extent to 
which an individual relies on personal versus social information (learning through the 
observation of others).  
 
Order hierarchy for making optimal decisions 
 
When a group faces a problem, some members have more clues, some others have less idea 
regarding the solution. Some individuals tend to follow others, while some prefer to rely on their 
own information. But what are the proper ratios in an optimally performing group, and how these 
characteristics relate to each other? In the present subsection, optimal performance is associated 
with finding an accurate solution using the smallest amount of ―cost‖, where the most important 
cost is competence, since acquiring it requires knowledge, experience, learning, etc. Other 
aspects can also appear as cost, most importantly the time factor.  
In order to address the above question, four estimation problems were considered: 
 
i. The simplest: an external parameter that can be either -1 or 1 (yes or no, black or white, 
to follow or not to follow some initiators, etc.). This can be called the ―voting model‖, or 
―voting GPMM‖, where GPMM stands for ―group performance maximization model‖, 
ii. A general and abstract, which is at the same time simple and thus widely applicable: 
Sequence-guessing (SG) GPMM, in which a sequence of values had to be estimated,  
iii. A case study: The direction finding GPMM, where a pre-defined direction had to be 
found. 
iv. The ―Flocking GPMM‖ in which a group of agents has to reach a pre-defined target by 
moving on a two dimensional surface. This one is a special case compared to the others 
because here the communication structure (network) of the agents is not fixed, but 
changing continuously according to the individuals‘ actual position. 
 
In order to elicit the possible effects of the communication structure, the first three games 
(models/GPMMs) are played on different types of fixed communication networks: 
 
a. Small-world network (SW) 
b. Erdős–Rényi (ER) network 
c. And a real-life social network describing the friendship relations in a school (referred to 
as ―Friendship‖ or ―Frnd‖ network).  
 
Rather counter-intuitively, it was found that the optimal ability and pliancy distributions 
were quite independent of the type of the networks used. 
The relevance of the fourth (―Flocking‖) GPMM originates from the fact that among 
animals, the most often studied collective decision-making scenario is the one during which the 
group has to navigate collectively towards a(n often pre-defined) target. (See also Sect. 3.1.2) 
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Accordingly, simulations were designed in which a group had to reach a target in the shortest 
possible way. In contrast with the other games, the communication network was not fixed, but 
varied continually as a function of the agents‘ location: each individual ―saw‖, and thus 
interacted with others within a given range of interaction, ―ROI‖.  
In all cases, the collective decision was achieved via iterative rounds of interactions. In each 
round, each agent made a guess (decision) in which he/she incorporated his/her own estimate 
(individual knowledge) with that of his/her neighbours (public information) to a varying extent. 
We call this disposition to follow others ―pliancy‖, denoted by λ in (3.1).  
Precisely, the behaviour of agent i is defined by the following equation: 
 
 Bei
(t+1)
=(1-λi)f(Coi) + λi<Be
t
j>jϵR, (3.1) 
 
where, t is the time (number of iterations), Bei is the (observable) behaviour of agent i, for 
example its direction, Coi is the competence level (between 0 and 1, with higher values denoting 
better abilities). The estimation of agent i regarding the correct solution is a function of his/her 
competence: f(Coi). The (observable) average behaviour of the neighbours of member i at time 
step t is <Be
t
j>jϵR, where j(ϵR) denotes the neighbours. λi, the weight parameter, takes on values 
from the [0, 1] interval. 
The optimization was done with genetic algorithm, with the competence and pliancy values 
evolving. The fitness function depended on the group performance Pe and on the average 
competition level <Co>, according to (3.2) 
 
 F = Pe – K<Co> (3.2) 
 
where K is a parameter reflecting the ―cost of learning‖.  
The best group characteristics were then approached by varying the distribution of the 
competence and pliancy values of the members. The process of problem solving is stopped after 
some simple criteria are satisfied, e.g., a given number of steps were reached, the guesses 
converged or they achieved a pre-defined accuracy. The optimal distribution was associated with 
the average distribution of the pliancy and competence values belonging to the 500 best 
performing (most optimal, having the largest F) groups. 
Because of the simplicity of the model, many real-life cases can be mapped on it. The 
performance of the group, Pe, is quantifiable and characterized by a parameter taking values on 
the [0, 1] interval. Higher Pe values mean better performance. The contribution of member i
 
to 
the collective problem solving depends on its competence level Coi which also takes values on 
the [0, 1] interval. Here too, larger values correspond to better abilities. Some noise, explicitly or 
implicitly, was also incorporated into the models. 
In the present subsection we focus on the first three models in which the interactions were 
defined according to pre-defined networks. 
In the Voting GPMM – having some analogy with the widely used Ising model - , the group 
had to find the correct answer by choosing from two options (yes/no, -1/1, etc.). This minimal 
model consists of two steps only:  
 
 
1. First, all actors make a guess being correct with the probability proportional to their 
competences.  
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2. Then the agents count the guesses of their neighbours, based on which the group casts a 
vote.  
 
The second step is done according to (3.1). Figure 3.10 c shows the result for the optimal 
competence distribution when all λi=1, that is, when the choices of the neighbours determine 
entirely the vote of an individual. This distribution ensures the highest rate of correct votes, and 
thus, the highest group performance as well. 
 
 
Fig. 3.10 The Voting GPMM model. a ―Friendship graph‖, the pre-defined communication network which was a 
real-life social network reflecting the amity relations in a high school among 204 students (after Harris et al. 2009). 
b An enlarged part of the network showing the relations of a randomly selected node coloured yellow. c The optimal 
competence distribution: a highly skewed function with a fat tail. Reproduced from Zafeiris and Vicsek (2013) 
The optimal competence distributions presented in Fig. 3.10 c and 3.11 d are typical in the 
sense that in all cases (that is, in all models with any parameter set and network type) the optimal 
values form a hierarchically ordered distribution, with progressively fewer members having high 
competence values than low. The only difference is that in the case of the Direction finding 
GPMM and Sequence guessing GPMM, the fat tails are structured, having a smooth ―hump‖ on 
them, while the tail belonging to the Voting GPMM is ―smooth‖ (Fig. 3.10 c). Furthermore - 
somewhat counter-intuitively - the particular structure of the underlying communication network 
does not have a relevant effect on the optimal distribution. For more details see (Zafeiris and 
Vicsek 2013). 
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Fig. 3.11 Results for the Direction finding model on the Friendship graph. K=2, the parameter describing the cost of 
knowledge. a The course of the optimization with the relevant values: pliancy, competence and fitness. b the 
competence and pliancy values depicted on a unit square. Each dot represents an individual: c the same as b but here 
axis z depicts the density of the points. Considerably more agents have low competence values coupled to high level 
of pliancy than vice versa. d Optimal competence distribution. e Optimal pliancy distribution. f comparison of the 
group efficiencies Pe after 20 steps of iteration for the one identified as optimal and a selection of commonly 
assumed distributions. From left to right: Optimized/continuous, two valued (allowed competence values were 0.1 
and 0.9), uniform, Gaussian, and constant. In order to emphasize the effect of the distribution of the competence 
values, the pliancy values were set to be antagonistic for all five cases according to λi=(1-Coi)+ξ, where ξ is noise. 
The average competence level is identical in all cases. Reproduced from Zafeiris and Vicsek (2013). 
During the optimization process, the pliancy values (λ) and the competence values (Co) were 
evolved simultaneously and independently from each other. The first and foremost conspicuous 
result was that the pliancy values – in analogy with the competence values – form a highly 
skewed distribution as well. However, in this case agents with high pliancy values made up the 
majority (Fig. 3.11 e).  
Figure 3.11 b and c grants a deep insight to the relationship between the competence and 
pliancy values in an optimized group, and sheds light onto the origin of the ―hump‖ as well. The 
location of each point in Fig. 3.11 b is defined by the corresponding individuals‘ competences (x 
axis) and pliancy (y axis) values. Two kinds of agents appear: one kind clusters in the top left 
corner, corresponding to small competence and high pliancy values (these actors have ―sheep 
mentality‖, and significantly outnumber the rest of the group), while the others have 
considerably higher competence values mostly coupled with small pliancy. The hump – 
observable in most of the competence histograms – is due to the second kind of agents. It can be 
concluded that the simultaneous choice of both the competence and the pliancy values are 
essential, and the optimal choice results in a strong improvement of the efficiency of the group. 
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Continuous vs. bimodal competence distributions 
 
We believe that the reason behind the finding that continuous competence distribution eventuates 
higher group performance than the ―bimodal‖ distribution (in which the competence values can 
be either 0 or 1) is due to a phenomenon that we call ―information spreading or mixing‖, which 
can be summarized as follows:  
 
Multi-level hierarchical interactions make the spreading (mixing) of the information between the 
individuals much more efficient than in a “two-level” system. 
 
This conceptual statement is based on the following assumptions: (i) the individuals do not 
know the competence level of the others, (ii) the pliancy values are approximately proportional 
to the inverse of the competence values (which is the general assumption in two-level systems), 
and finally, (iii) not all members interact with all others, but according to an underlying network 
– which is a natural assumption for groups beyond a certain size. Given these conditions, the 
two-level competence distribution can often result in temporarily or even permanently 
segregated groups maintaining different ―opinions‖ or estimates, while the continuous 
distribution performs better.  
The reason behind this possibility of segregation is that uninformed individuals have a 
strong tendency to follow the others (since they have high pliancy values). Sub-groups of the 
whole group can thus easily come to a conclusion corresponding to a wrong estimate or solution 
which they will maintain until a better estimate ―diffuses‖ to their community from other groups 
having highly competent agents.  
These results provide a framework for a wide selection of phenomena including several 
recent observations, such as: how a few well-informed individual is able to lead a group 
efficiently (Whallon et al. 2011, Conradt and List 2009, King and Cowlishaw 2009, Reebs 
2000), the surprising observation made by company managers that a group of skilled workers do 
not outperform a group with diverse abilities (Surowiecki 2005, Hamilton et al. 2003) and the 
results of models optimizing the strategies of individuals performing a specific task as part of a 
collective. These findings emerge from the interaction dynamics within the collective. 
 
3.2 Hierarchy in Humans  
3.2.1 Our biological and social heritage 
 
In the previous sections of this chapter we presented results regarding dominance hierarchy 
which seems to be ubiquitous in the animal world. Since humans can be regarded as a particular 
representative of the animal kingdom, the above mechanisms apply to us as well, although 
accompanied by some new features. Anatomically modern humans – with whom our bodies are 
indistinguishable – appeared around 200,000 years ago. About 70,000 years ago an even more 
important event happened, what anthropologists and historians often call ―Cognitive revolution‖ 
(Harari 2013) – a shift that launched human culture. These changes had fundamental impact on 
the self-organizational processes of human groups as well, and, accordingly, on the way 
hierarchies were formed.  
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The most important elements of this new ability are that (i) humans have become able to 
create formal roles (such as chieftain, king, pharaoh, colonel, etc.) which are independent of an 
actual individual, and (ii) among these formal roles, any kind of network of relations – that is, 
e.g., hierarchy – is conceivable, starting with complete egalitarianism up to the strictest 
dictatorship. Importantly, only the ability enabling the creation of such roles and their relations is 
coded genetically, meanwhile the specific nature of the hierarchy is not. This latter one is coded 
culturally, and thus, in order to distinguish it from the dominance hierarchy, we shall call it 
cultural hierarchy. Table 3.1 shows a comparison regarding the most important features of the 
two types of hierarchies. Furthermore, cultural hierarchy is in close relation to our affinity 
towards rules and towards following these rules and punishing those who do not follow them 
appropriately.  
In human groups both the dominance and the cultural hierarchies are present, and, although 
their origins and functioning are rather independent, they interact in a unique way with each 
other and this interaction, from time to time, can create conflict within (or among) the group(s). 
 
 
Table 3.1 Comparison of the two types of hierarchies present in human groups: Dominance hierarchy and cultural 
hierarchy. 
 
Dominance hierarchy 
 
 Genetically coded  
→ restricted variability: the basic 
features are the same within one 
species. 
 Controlled mainly by hormones 
(testosterone, stress hormones, etc.) 
→mostly instinctive 
 Its main purpose is to minimise the 
inner-group aggression by determining 
the access to the common resources 
 
Cultural hierarchy 
 
 Culturally coded 
→can take any form from strict 
dictatorship to complete 
 egalitarianism 
 Controlled mainly by the Neocortex 
→mostly conscious 
 
 Its main purpose is to harmonize the 
behaviour of the group members via 
political power. 
 
Distinguishing these two hierarchy types also resolves the ―mystery‖ surrounding the ―lost 
hierarchy‖ of hunter-gatherer groups. According to this view, the (mostly) egalitarian nature of 
hunter-gatherer groups is very difficult to explain, since from the animal world we have inherited 
a strong tendency towards hierarchical group organization, and after the settlement (around 10-
15,000 years ago) hierarchies appeared again. So where did it disappear in between (Dubreuil 
2010)? A likable answer is that it did not disappear anywhere; dominance hierarchy has been 
continually present throughout human history in all human groups, although often oppressed by 
culturally coded norms manifesting themselves – among others –  in cultural hierarchy. In 
hunter-gatherer societies the cultural hierarchy is most often week (but not always), and is close 
to an egalitarian organization. 
In the following, when we refer to human hierarchies, we mean cultural hierarchy, if not 
stated otherwise. 
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3.2.2 Large-scale hierarchies in societies  
 
During the vast majority of the circa 200 thousand years of human history people lived in small-
scale, mostly egalitarian hunter-gatherer communities comprising around 30-50, or at most a few 
hundred individuals. The beginning of the transition to larger scale and more complex societies 
happened only 10 to 12 thousand years ago, when humans firstly settled and engaged in 
agriculture and animal domestication. The first large, state level societies appeared around 5 
thousand years ago (in Egypt and Mesopotamia) and the scale of the societies has been 
increasing ever since. 
The deep reasons for these transitions – primarily the first one, marking the transition from 
hunter-gatherer life style to settled communities – are quite blurry. Although many theories have 
been proposed, none of them seems to be completely satisfactory or clinching. Furthermore, in 
accordance with the general nature of historical and anthropological interpretations, they are 
mostly descriptive, making it difficult to make predictions allowing testing against measured 
data. However, in recent years, there has been a gratifying increase in formal (mostly, but not 
exclusively agent based) models regarding historical and anthropological issues (Barceló and 
Castillo (eds) 2016, Grinin and Korotayev (eds) 2014, Pumain and Reuillon 2017). Agent based 
models combined with game theoretical approach have also been proposed (Boix 2015, Greif 
2006). The book of Turchin (2003) has a relevant analytical treatment of the problem. 
In the present subsection we shall overview two formal approaches describing large scale 
hierarchies in human societies. One approach, the work of Turchin et al., will be reviewed in 
more details while the work of Boix (2015) will be described only briefly. Although many 
important related works exist, here we selected those two of them which offer a quantitative 
theory with predictions which make testing against real-life data possible.  
In the search for the main driving forces behind historical patterns, Turchin and Gavrilets 
identifies warfare and multilevel selection as the two main causes leading to complex, 
hierarchical societies (Turchin and Gavrilets 2009, Gavrilets et al. 2010). Their (here somewhat 
simplified) train of thought is the following:  
 
 Throughout most of human history people lived in small-scale, mostly egalitarian 
societies. 
 These tribes often engaged in warfare with each other, over various resources. 
 Although selfish behaviour can be beneficial for the individuals within a group, when 
groups intensively compete with each other (for example during warfare) those groups 
have the advantage which have more cooperative and less selfish members. Thus, human 
societies are subject to multilevel selection.  
 On the one hand, warfare has the following effects on social evolution: 
o Groups become internally more cohesive 
o It drives technological progress, including military and organizational 
applications 
o It triggers the enlargement of group sizes, since ―God always favours the big 
battalions‖ – as formulated by either Napoleon or Turenne.  
 On the other hand, the capacity of the human brain has its limits as it cannot handle the 
social relations in detail among more than around 150 people (known as the ―Dunbar 
number‖ after Barton and Dunbar (1997)). In other words, there is a limit on the size of 
egalitarian, face-to-face human groups. 
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Given the above, there exists a pressure on the group size to grow while this enlargement 
has biologically rooted barriers. According to Turchin and Gavrilets, the evolutionary response 
to this dilemma was the appearance of 
 
1. the ability to demarcate group membership based on cultural traits (language, dialect, 
clothing, etc.) 
2. hierarchical organization, allowing groups sizes to grow basically ad infinitum, since 
each element within a given level of a strictly hierarchical system needs to have at most 
n+1 connections: n is the ―span of control‖, and the +1 accounts for its superior. 
 
If this hypothesis holds, more intense warfare results in bigger polities (political entities) 
with more hierarchical levels. In order to test this hypothesis they conducted numerical 
experiments by constructing the following agent-based model: The modelled area is divided into 
hexagonal cells (each representing a village) as shown in Fig. 3.12. Each of these autonomous 
local communities are characterised by  
 
 a base-line resource level, accounting for the heterogeneous environment, defining the 
productive/demographic potential of the region (a ―tunable‖ parameter.) 
 actual resource level: the base-line resource level minus the costs of the various actions in 
which the given community participates 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.12 An example of the model's realizations. This system consist of 37 communities organising themselves into 
four polities The numbers in the hexagons mark the chief communities. a Spatial view. b The hierarchical structure 
being tree-like as in most of the agent based models of community formations. Reproduced from Gavrilets et al. 
(2010). 
 
Each polity is organised in a hierarchical way (consisting of one or more 
villages/communities). Each subordinate community pays a fixed portion of its total resource to 
its chief village as tribute. Accordingly, the total resource level of a community is its base 
resource level minus the tribute it pays for its superior community plus the tribute it receives 
from its subordinates. 
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According to their estimated chances, polities may rebel or engage in warfare (conquest or 
being attacked) due to which their size permanently grows or decreases. A polity will attack its 
weakest neighbour if (i) it estimates that the attack will be successful, (ii) it is ready to pay the 
corresponding costs and (iii) it is not too devastated from previous wars. Quantitatively, the 
probability of an attack is: 
 
 
         
      
  
    
 
(3.3) 
 
where the terms are the following: 
The first term, Pij , which is the probability of the attack by community i on community j to 
be successful, increases the probability of the attack. The probability of success is 
 
 
    
  
 
  
    
  
(3.4) 
 
where Fi is the power of polity i and „a‟ is the ‗success probability exponent‘.  
The second term,       , accounting for the cost of warfare cij , decreases the probability of 
the attack. β is a parameter and Fi,0 is the maximum possible power of polity i.  
Each time step is considered to be a year. Each year the chief community of a polity decides 
whether to launch an attack on its weakest neighbour or not. If it decides to go on war then first it 
attempts to conquer the bordering communities, followed by a series of ―battles‖ until it either 
suffers a defeat or the chief community of the victim polity falls.  Annexing the conquered 
communities may require restructuring the hierarchical organization of the winner polity since 
the number of subordinates of any community has constraints (a parameter varying between 4 
and 10).  
When launching an attack, the direct subordinates of the aggressor chief community might 
decide to secede if they estimate that the attack will be unsuccessful. In this case the chief polity 
attempts to supress the rebellion, which, if successful, leads to spatial separation from the master 
state. All the subordinate communities of the rebelling village will secede too.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3.13 The size (a) and the hierarchical complexity (b) of the polities under low and high pressure of war. 
According to the predictions of the model, intense warfare results in larger and more complex polities. Reproduced 
from Turchin and Gavrilets (2009). 
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This model provides a fission-fusion cycle reminiscent of the dynamics characterising early 
states of humans. More importantly, the effect of the intensity of warfare on the complexity and 
sizes of polities can be analysed. As it can be seen in Fig. 3.13, low level of warfare results in 
considerably smaller polities regarding the extent of their territories (Fig. 3.13 a) with less 
hierarchical levels (Fig. 3.13 b). In contrast, high level of warfare results in larger and more 
complex polities, in accord with the case of historical societies (Turchin and Gavrilets 2009).  
The final purpose of such models is to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics of 
historical events by reproducing (at least some) properties of historical polities. Using an 
improved version of the above model, Turchin et al. (2013) tested its predictions for a realistic 
landscape of the Afro-Eurasian landscape against real historical data. The main proposition to be 
tested was that costly institutions enabling large human groups to stay together within one 
political unit and function as one society evolved as a result of warfare. More specifically, they 
compared the model‘s predictions with a large dataset documenting the spatiotemporal 
distribution of historical (large-scale) societies appearing in the Afro-Eurasian lands between 
1,500 BCE and 1,500 CE (See Fig. 3.14). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.14 Comparison of the predicted (b, d, f) and ―measured‖(a, c, e) data. The model predictions (―Data‖) are 
averages of 20 runs. The colour codes are the following: green: the absence of large-scale polities within the given 
time period, yellow: moderate density of large polities, and red: regions where large polities arose frequently. 
Reproduced from Turchin et al. (2013) 
 
Until now in this subsection we have seen ―political hierarchy‖ formed by superior and 
subordinate communities. But this is not the only type of hierarchy that is manifested in large-
scale societies. Inequality, the wealth distribution among members is another type, the one that is 
triggering much more attention and, accordingly, has much more extensive literature. However, 
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quantitative models are scarce in this field as well. Here we shall mention only one quantitative 
study briefly.  
By using a game theoretical approach, Carles Boix (2015) argues that voluntary cooperation 
exists only in small scale egalitarian communities, while economic growth inevitably brings 
about inequality (hierarchy), breaking down spontaneous cooperation. Economic growth usually 
results from technological development, such as plant domestication or the appearance of a new 
agricultural tool. According to his model, these changes precede the formation of state – which 
statement is in contrast with the main-stream view holding that the formation of state was first, 
and inequality appeared as a result of it. (In his work institutions play a much more limited role 
than it is usually assumed.) According to his framework, group members benefiting from the 
technological change can be considered as ―producers‖, while those group members who are not, 
will be the ―looters‖. The state emerges as a result of this situation. The type of a given state 
depends on the primary military technology: if the technology favours looters (e.g., those who 
use horses), monarchies tend to rise, while military machineries favouring producers (e.g. navy) 
call forth republican polities. The early states were mostly monarchies, but some of them were 
republican or mixed. Inequality tends to be higher in monarchical polities, but it depends on 
political institutions and other endowments as well. 
 
3.2.3 Nested hierarchy structure of human societies 
 
Up to this point, when discussing hierarchy, we have been considering flow hierarchy. However, 
the structure of human societies exhibits a nested nature as well with a preferred scaling ratio 
between 3 and 4. (For the definition of nested hierarchy see Sect. 2.) In other words, instead of a 
continuous spectrum of group sizes, it was argued that a geometrical series of 3-5, 12-20, 30-45, 
etc. individuals (Zhou et al. 2005) per group size can be observed.  
Various anthropological studies report that both human (Kottak 1991) and non-human 
primate (Dunbar 1988) societies consist of a series of nested groups classified as (Dunbar and 
Spoor 1995, Hill and Dunbar 2003, Zhou et al. 2005):  
 
 Support clique is the smallest one with the strongest emotional ties, ―defined as the set of 
individuals from whom the respondent would seek personal advice or help in times of 
severe emotional and financial distress; its mean size is typically 3–5 individuals.‖ (Zhou 
et al. 2005) 
 Sympathy group, characteristically containing 12-20 individuals, those with special 
(―friendship‖) ties, contacting each other at least once every month.  
 Bands (or overnight camps), reported in the ethnographic literature on hunter-gatherer 
societies (Dunbar 1993), refer to those more or less unstable groups of 30-50 individuals 
whose members belong to the same clan. 
 Clan (or regional group) contains ca. 150 individuals. This formation is very typical in 
small-scale traditional societies, and this number, 150, has become known as the 
―Dunbar number‖ referring to the biological limits of human cognition. According to the 
Social brain hypothesis (Byrne and Whiten 1988; Barton and Dunbar 1997) the main 
evolutionary force acting on the formation of primate brain has been the need to 
remember, coordinate and manage the complex social relations within a group. Since the 
stability of a group depends on the intimate knowledge of each other (meaning the ability 
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to keep count of the social ties based on which the behaviour of the group mates‘ can be 
predicted), the size of the brain (assumed to be proportional to its computational ability) 
imposes a limit on the group size. Above this limit, the group inevitably becomes 
unstable and splits up. 
 Mega-band is the next level identified in the literature, comprising about 500 individuals, 
and finally the 
 Tribe unites ca. 1000-2000 individuals, those belonging to the same linguistic unit. 
 
Zhou et al. (2005) searched the sociological and other related literatures for quantitative data 
on such human groupings, based on which they constructed a dataset consisting of 61 groups. 
The 3
rd
 column of Table 3.2 indicates the mean values of the sizes for all the six group types.  
Next they calculated the ratio of the sizes of the successive groups Si-1 and Si, and found that  
 
 |  |
|    |
    8        98         8      
 
(3.5) 
 
for i=1,…,6. |….| denotes the average group size (3rd column in Table 3.2), and the mean value 
of these ratios is 3.52. Based on these values, they concluded that ―humans form groups 
according to a discrete hierarchy with a preferred scaling ratio between 3 and 4.‖ (Zhou et al. 
2005) 
 
Table 3.2 Human (and other primate) societies tend to have a well-defined inner structure 
consisting of nested communities with a scaling ratio between 3 and 4. The table shows 
the names of these communities (2
nd
 column) and their mean sizes (3
rd
 column). 
Reproduced from Zhou et al. (2005). 
 
 
 Group type Mean group size 
S0 Ego (individual) 1 
S1 Support clique 4.6 
S2 Sympathy group 14.3 
S3 Band 42.6 
S4 Clan 132.5 
S5 Mega-band 566.6 
S6 Tribe 1728 
 
Being interested in similar questions, Hamilton et al. (2007) reviewed the ethnographic 
literature on hunter-gatherer societies and analysed the data of 1189 social groups belonging to 
339 hunter-gatherer societies. They also found a self-similar structure with a scaling ratio close 
to 4. Importantly, their database contained groups from highly distinct cultures from five 
continents.  
These findings all indicate that there exists a kind of biologically rooted attribute defining 
fundamental features of human (and primate) social self-organization. A further support for this 
view came from the statistical analysis of a large-scale, high-precision, internet-based social 
network formed by the players of a massive multiplayer online game (MMOG) called Pardus 
(Fuchs et al. 2014). In this game (http://www.pardus.at), more than 400,000 players control 
avatars living in a virtual, futuristic world. Their interaction is based on an internal, private (one-
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to-one) messaging system through which they can communicate without restrictions. Among 
others, they can make friendships, express their sympathy or revulsion, they can trade, cooperate 
or defect. As a result, a superposition of dense social networks of various types (trade, 
friendship, communication) is spontaneously created.  
The most important result is that even though the game is purely virtual – and as such it does 
not allow face-to-face human interactions – a highly structured social system emerges, one that 
strongly resembles those found among hunter-gatherers and other ―real-life‖ human societies.  
On the low levels of the friendship and communications networks, the support cliques 
appear, containing 5.1 individuals on average. The next level contains the ―clubs‖ 
(corresponding to the sympathy groups) with 11.5 members in average. On the middle scale 
―alliances‖ appear: this type of groups is a formal establishment in the game. The average size of 
this formation is 24.7, and the biggest alliance contains 136 members – a value pretty close to the 
Dunbar number. In fact, by analysing the same game, Pardus, Szell and Thurner (2010) found 
that the upper limit for friendship and other communication communities is exactly the Dunbar 
number, a value that does not seem to change by the usage of digital media (Dunbar 2012).  
The next organizational level, the ―political factions‖ are pre-defined by the game designers, 
so at this level we finish the discussion of spontaneously emerging communities. However, it is 
important to note, that even under such conditions the group sizes on these higher levels remain 
of the same order of magnitude than the ones observed in real-life human societies.  
 
3.2.4 Phenomenological theory of collective decision-making 
 
This subsection addresses a common situation in which hierarchy manifests itself in a specific 
way. The problem to be solved is complex (or ―multidimensional‖) and, as such, needs several 
―specialists‖ to be solved efficiently. Thus, there is a simple two-level hierarchy involved: within 
a given field involving distinct/particular knowledge, specialists are significantly better at 
solving problems than non-specialists. Furthermore, as it will be shown, in an optimally working 
group specialists will have at least some level of knowledge/insight related to other sub-
problems. (Zafeiris et al. 2017) Thus, the situation has some analogies with that of Sect. 3.1.4 
where - in order to find the best solution - the abilities of the group members were distributed 
according to an order hierarchy. But, here, a similar condition should hold simultaneously for a 
number of sub-problems. 
The process of collective decision-making has generated great scientific interest for a long 
time (Clearwater et al. 1991, Forsyth 2006, Surowiecki 2005, Planas et al. 2015), since it is a 
highly relevant aspect of social group behaviour. In particular, it has been measured, argued and 
shown analytically that the ―wisdom of crowds‖ can go qualitatively beyond that of the 
individuals (Surowiecki 2005). This statement is true for both animal and human communities 
(Conradt and List 2009, Nagy et al. 2010, Couzin et al. 2011). An essential, but rarely considered 
case is when the problem has many ―dimensions‖, i.e., it has many facets and aspects. Under 
such conditions the performance of the group (the quality of the collective solution) is highly 
influenced by the composition of the group. Apparently, if the group members are identical, the 
performance of the group cannot go beyond the performance of its members. However, if the 
problem to be solved is complex, i.e., has a number of different aspects or dimensions (Vicsek 
2002) then a group with members specialized in their own respective fields of expertise is 
expected to be much more efficient in providing a high quality answer than a uniform 
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community. The stress is on the independent nature of the sub-problems, making the problem 
multidimensional. In a way, solving multidimensional problems can be considered as a 
quantitative approach to the problem of labour division (Smith 1970, Durkheim 1997) in the 
context of collective decision-making: the task is to bring about a decision, and the division is 
made among the specialists who work out the solutions for the various sub-problems. 
In spite of the above almost trivial observation regarding the necessity of specialists in 
heterogeneous/diverse groups, a quantitative demonstration of its validity needs a carefully 
constructed framework. Prior works involving quantitative analysis primarily focused on 
problems that could be regarded as ―one-dimensional‖ (Surowiecki 2005, Page 2010, Hong and 
Page 2001, Zafeiris and Vicsek 2013) in the sense that the problem to be solved needed a single 
kind of ability (for example, navigational skill). In the case of one-dimensional problems it has 
been demonstrated – by using approaches from theory (Page 2010, Hong and Page 2001), agent 
based simulations (Guttal and Couzin 2010), genetic optimization (Zafeiris and Vicsek 2013) 
and observations (Hamilton et al. 2003, Ruderman et al. 1996) - that diverse groups can 
outperform homogeneous ones.  
Some scenarios covered by the model presented below include (i) a board of directors for a 
large company, (ii) groups of animals searching for resources, (iii) a government, (iv) a scientific 
team for interdisciplinary research, etc. In the example of the board of directors a potential 
candidate for a problem can be the question of where to build the next factory. The various 
aspects of this problem are quite diverse, each of them requiring specific knowledge, like the 
history of the given country, characteristics of the labour force, education, local taxation laws, 
geographical and logistic conditions, potential markets in the region, and so on. Importantly, the 
members of the group cannot get any information about the quality of their proposals from an 
―outsider‖ knowing the optimal solution ab ovo.  
The formal description of the collective decision-making process is the following: We 
consider groups of N individuals solving a problem P having M sub-problems Pj (j=1,2,…M) so 
that each sub-problem needs a unique (specific) skill/ability to be addressed (it should be pointed 
out that P is not specified further). Thus, a set of N x M abilities, A(i,j) (i=1,2,…N) or 
levels/degree of skill is to be considered. A(i,j) corresponds to the ability of an individual i to 
give the best answer for the jth sub-problem ( - in other words, ability corresponds to 
competence).  
Next it is assumed that A(i,j) takes values from the unit interval [0, 1]. It is important to note 
that the cost of obtaining an ability A is typically not a linear function of A, since achieving the 
capacity of perfect knowledge (A=1) is much more costly than achieving a partial knowledge 
(e.g., A=0.5). For the sake of simplicity we assume that the cost C for obtaining ability A, is C = 
f(A)= Const A
x 
 (where 1< x, and Const is a constant corresponding to the relative weight of the 
costs).  
In this framework, the optimization is done with a genetic algorithm, where the evolving 
parameters are the A(i,j) values. The initial distribution is random, and the fitness function (to be 
maximized) is  
 
       (3.6) 
 
where Q is the quality of the final collective decision. 
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In other words, high fitness values correspond to distributions providing the best possible 
solution for the smallest possible (or for a given prefixed) cost. Then, the process of collective 
decision-making is divided into four basic stages. 
 
1. Each member i suggests a solution for each sub-problem Pj in a way that the quality of 
the given proposition Qij depends only on i‘s competence, Aij . This assumption, in the 
simplest case means that Qij= Aij, although, importantly, the addition of noise did not 
change our results. 
2. Perhaps this is the most essential step of the algorithm: group members, one after another, 
provide an evaluation of the proposals of the other members. If a member has zero ability 
to evaluate the proposal for a given sub-problem, then the contribution of this member to 
choose an otherwise excellent proposition becomes totally erratic. Conversely, even a 
relatively small ability to estimate the right quality of a proposal results in a decreased 
level of randomness in the evaluation and, in this way, provides a more accurate estimate 
of the quality of the proposition. Formally this step is described as next: The evaluation 
of member i‟ regarding the quality Qij is denoted by    
   and it is proportional to Qij (the 
quality of that given proposal). The accuracy of the evaluation    
   is distorted by a 
stochastic factor representing that those members who have small abilities to evaluate a 
proposal belonging to a given field of expertise j (that is,      is small), tend to make 
mistakes during their evaluation with an amplitude involving randomness.  
 
    
            (      )       (3.7) 
 
where Rand is a random number from the (0, 1) interval.  
3. ―Round table discussion‖. This step refers to the stage when somebody (most often, but 
not always an expert of the given field) tries to convince other members of the group 
about her/his opinion by sharing her/his ideas. Formally, X% (X=10, 20 or 30) of the N 
members is chosen in proportion to their ability in the given field to present their 
evaluations, to which the evaluations of others converge.  
4. Finally, the quality of the solution for a given Pj is obtained by accepting the proposal of 
member i∗ receiving the highest average evaluation. The quality Q of the solution for the 
original problem P is then obtained by aggregating these proposals (having the highest 
evaluations) for all the j=1…M fields, after the last round. 
 
The most important result is summarized in Fig.3.15 c, where each column represents a sub-
problem (specialty), and each row refers to an individual (group member). The colour of the 
square in the i
th
 row and j
th
 column corresponds to Aij, according to the colour bar (Fig. 3.15 d). 
As it can be seen, there is exactly one red square in each column, meaning that exactly one 
expert is needed for each field. By and large, these results overlap with the general intuition 
(holding that a well performing group needs a specialist for all fields, but no more ‖extra 
knowledge‖ is required from other members). What is less intuitive is that the rest of the squares 
are not homogeneously dark blue (corresponding to close-to-zero knowledge), but they are all 
shades of blue, meaning that in a group, optimal decision can be made if the members have at 
least some idea of other members‘ field of expertise. This result is likely to be due to better flow 
of relevant information among the group members. 
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Figure 3.15 a and b depicts the course of optimization: the fitness function F, the quality of 
the solution Q, the cost C and the diversity D, as a function of the generation number G. In all 
cases we find that the optimal distribution of the abilities is highly diverse. Diversity is 
calculated according to (3.8) 
 
 
  
∑ [(   
 
   )     ]   
  (   )
 
 
(3.8) 
because this definition – motivated by Freeman (1978) –  differentiates appropriately among the 
diversity of distributions in a way being both in  agreement with the intuition and sensitive 
enough in the range determined by the actual distributions of Aij-s.  
The plots in Fig. 3.15 display the behaviour of the model for N=10 and M=14, but these 
features of the optimal ability distribution do not differ qualitatively for other sets of N and M. 
Random initial conditions correspond to relatively low fitness values and high costs. The 
efficiency/fitness of a group quickly increases at the first stage of the optimization. It is to be 
noted that higher fitness values (F) correspond to higher diversity values (D). 
On the left (sub picture a) the ability cost is fixed, referring to a more general situation 
where a fixed amount of resource can be distributed among the members. Sub picture b belongs 
to the case when there is no pre-defined limit regarding the growth of the ability values, except 
for the fitness function in which it appears as a cost. (Note that the average ability is not the 
same as the cost of ability because C is not a linear function of A.)  
 
 
 
Fig. 3.15 The process (a, b) and the result (c) of calculating the optimal distribution of abilities, A
OPT
(i,j), using 
genetic algorithm as optimization method. The course of the optimization: the fitness (F), the diversity (D) and the 
average ability level as a function if the generation number (G). In sub figure a the ability cost (C) is fixed to 0.3 
(hence the fitness function F depends only on the performance of the group Q). On sub figure b the fitness F is 
calculated as F=Q-C, that is, C is not fixed. The averaging is made over a population size of 2000 groups. The 
corresponding diversity, D, is indicated by black line. The groups consisted of N=10 members and the problem P 
had M=14 sub-problems. Sub figure c displays the optimal ability matrix visualized by colours - the scale being 
indicated in d. These results describe a generic case, into which a few plausible assumptions are incorporated: the 
sub-problems have equal importance (weight) and X=30% of the members take role in the round-table discussion. 
The most relevant message of c is that there is one specialist for each sub-problem and, perhaps rather intriguingly, 
the specialists are found to have a clearly non-negligible competence concerning several of the other sub-problems. 
If we add some cost for the case when a single person is a specialist of more than one sub-problem, the solution 
ceases to have multiple specialities per person. Reproduced from Zafeiris et al. (2017) 
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Up to this point a certain ratio of evaluators (commenters) were assumed during the 
discussion phase. By fixing various values Xe (e=1,2,…) for this ratio and assuming a related 
cost function Ct = Constt f(Xe) the full cost function becomes the sum of the formerly introduced 
C and Ct. 
Figure 3.16 shows how the efficiency (fitness) of a group depends on the number of contributors 
for various time-dependent cost coefficients. It is interesting to note that for a range of 
parameters the optimal number of contributors is scattered in a range around 30% of the size of 
the group. In this way we can support a widely observed phenomenon as well regarding the 
relation of the efficiency of a meeting and its duration. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.16 Efficiency of a group as a function of the number of commenters during the negotiation phase, for various 
time cost values, in a group consisting of a: 10 and b: 20 members. For a range of the parameters the maximum is 
scattered around 0.3% of N where N is the size of the group. 
 
 
The above results are also exemplified by a number of studies on collaboration, especially 
on the creative groups formed by scientists, working on solving increasingly complex problems. 
At a recent meeting (Ball 2015) on interdisciplinary science it was concluded that productive 
interdisciplinary researchers have a deep knowledge of at least one field but also a working 
awareness of others. In other words, during broad collaborations individuals' breadth is as 
important as their depth of knowledge within their own field of expertise. In fact, Uzzi and 
collaborators have shown using huge bibliographic data sets (see, e.g., Wuchty et al. 2007, Uzzi 
et al. 2013) that papers of high impact tend to be produced by larger collaborations involving a 
broader scope of knowledge. One interpretation of these observations is likely to be related to the 
growing relevance of interdisciplinary research, requiring various kinds of specific scientific 
inputs. 
The formalism discussed in the present subsection covers applications to more specific cases 
corresponding to various real-life situations. It can be considered as the decision-making 
equivalent of the ―division of labour‖ concept. It can also be easily generalised to cases with 
various relative weights/influences of the members of a group (depending, e.g., on their social 
status in an organization). Additional future research could address further interesting questions 
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such as, e.g., the effect of ―overlapping‖ problems, the optimal size of a group for a given 
number of sub-problems, the most reasonable time interval spent on discussions, etc. 
Furthermore, the bilateral relations among the members (which may be interpreted as an 
underlying network) can also play an important role in finding the best solution.  
 
 
Reference list 
 
Adler NE, Boyce T, Chesney MA et al (1994) Socioeconomic status and health: The challenge 
of the gradient. Am Psychol, 49:15-24 
Ákos Z, Beck R, Nagy M et al (2014) Leadership and Path Characteristics during Walks Are 
Linked to Dominance Order and Individual Traits in Dogs. PloS Comput Biol 10(1): e1003446 
Ball P (2015) Private communication 
Ballerini M, Cabibbo N, Candelier R. et al (2008) Interaction ruling animal collective behavior 
depends on topological rather than metric distance: Evidence from a field study. PNAS 105: 
1232 
Barceló JA, Castillo FD (eds) (2016) Simulating Prehistoric and Ancient Worlds (Computational 
Social Sciences). Springer, Cham, Switzerland 
Barton RA, Dunbar RIM (1997) Evolution of the social brain. In: Whiten A, Byrne RW (eds) 
Machiavellian intelligence II. Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, p 240–263 
Bíró D, Sumpter DJT, Meade J et al (2006) From compromise to leadership in pigeon homing. 
Curr Biol 16:2123-2128 
Boix C (2015) Political Order and Inequality. Cambridge Univ. Press, New Jersey 
Boos M, Pritz J, Lange S et al (2014) Leadership in Moving Human Groups. PLoS Comput Biol 
10(4):e1003541. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003541 
Byrne RW, Whiten A (eds) (1988) Machiavellian intelligence. Oxford Univ Press, Oxford 
Clearwater S, Huberman B, Hogg T (1991) Cooperative solution of constraint satisfaction 
problems. Science 254:1181-1183 
Conradt L, List C (2009) Group decisions in humans and animals: a survey. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 
B. 364:719-742 
Conradt L, Roper TJ, (2003) Group decision-making in animals. Nature 421:155-158 
Couzin ID, Ioannou CC, Demirel G et al (2011) Uninformed Individuals Promote Democratic 
Consensus in Animal Groups. Science 334:1578-1580 
72 
 
Couzin ID, Krause J, Franks NR et al (2005) Effective leadership and decision-making in animal 
groups on the move. Nature 433:513-516 
Creel S (2001) Social dominance and stress hormones. Trends Ecol Evolut 16(9):491-497 
Dubreuil B (2010) Human Evolution and the Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Dunbar RIM (1988) Primate social systems. Chapman & Hall, London 
Dunbar RIM (1993) Coevolution of neocortex size, group size and language in humans. Behav 
Brain Sci 16:681–694 
Dunbar RIM (2012) Social cognition on the internet: testing constraints on social network size. 
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 367:2192-2201 
Dunbar RIM, Spoor M (1995) Social networks, support cliques and kinship. Hum. Nature 6:273–
290 
Durkheim E (1997) The Division of Labor in Society. The Free Press, New York 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt I (1990) Dominance, Submission, and Love: Sexual Pathologies from the 
perspective of Ethology. In: Feierman J R (ed) Pedophilia - Biosocial Dimensions. Springer New 
York, pp 150-175 
Fischhoff IR, Sundaresan SR, Cordingley J et al (2007) Social relationships and reproductive 
state influence leadership roles in movements of plains zebra, Equus burchellii. Anim Behav 73: 
825-831 
Forsyth DR (2006) Decision making. In Forsyth DR, Group Dynamics, 5th edn. Thomson 
Wadsworth, Belmont CA, p 317-349 
Freeman LC (1978) Centrality in social networks: Conceptual clarification. Soc. Networks 
1(3):215-239 
Fuchs B, Sornette D, Thurner S (2014) Fractal multi-level organisation of human groups in a 
virtual world. Sci Rep 4:6526. doi:10.1038/srep06526 
Gavrilets S, Anderson DG, Turchin P (2010) Cycling in the Complexity of Early Societies. 
Cliodynamics 1:58-80 
Gerencsér L, Vásárhelyi G, Nagy M et al (2013) Identification of Behaviour in Freely Moving 
Dogs (Canis familiaris) Using Inertial Sensors. PloS one 8(10): e77814 
Gesquiere LR, Learn NH, Simao MCM et al (2011) Life at the Top: Rank and Stress in Wild 
Male Baboons. Science 333:357-360 
Greif A (2006) Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade. 
Cambridge Univ. Press, New York 
73 
 
Grinin L, Korotayev A (eds) (2014) History & Mathematics: Trends and Cycles. Uchitel, 
Volgograd 
Guttal V, Couzin ID (2010) Social interactions, information use, and the evolution of collective 
migration. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107:16172-16177 
Hamilton MJ, Milne BT, Walker RS et al (2007) The complex structure of hunter-gatherer social 
networks. Proc R Soc B 274:2195-2202 
Hamilton BH, Nickerson JA, Owan H (2003) Team incentives and worker heterogeneity: an 
empirical analysis of the impact of teams on productivity and participation. J Pol Econ 111:465-
497 
Harari YN (2013) Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. Random House, London 
Hill RA, Dunbar RIM (2003) Social network size in humans. Hum Nature 14:53–72 
Hong L, Page SE (2001) Problem solving by heterogeneous agents. J. Econ. Theory 97:123-163 
Hölldobler B, Wilson EO (2008) The superorganism: The Beauty, Elegance and strangeness of 
Insect Societies. W.W. Norton & Co., New York 
Huber P (1802) Observations on several species of the genus apis, known by the name of humble 
bees, and called bombinatrices by linneaus. Trans Linn Soc Lond 6:214-98 
King AJ, Cowlishaw G (2009) Leaders, followers and group decision-making. Commun Integr 
Biol 2:1-4 
King AJ, Douglas CMS, Huchard E et al (2008) Dominance and affiliation mediate despotism in 
a social primate. Curr Biol 18: 1833–1838 
Kottak CP (1991) Cultural anthropology, 5th edn. McGraw-Hill, New York 
Mazur A, Lamb ThA (1980) Testosterone, status and mood in human males. Horm. 
Behav.14:236-246 
Miller N, Garnier S, Hartnett AT et al (2013) Both information and social cohesion determine 
collective decisions in animal groups. PNAS 110(13): 5263–5268 
Muller MN, Wrangham RW (2004) Dominance, cortisol and stress in wild chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes schweinfurthii).  Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 55(4):332-340 
Nagy M, Akos Z, Biro D et al (2010) Hierarchical group dynamics in pigeon flocks. Nature 
464(7290): 890-893 
Nagy M, Vásárhelyi G, Pettit B et al (2013) Context-dependent hierarchies in pigeons. PNAS 
110(32):13049-13054. doi:10.1073/pnas.1305552110 
74 
 
Ozogany K, Vicsek T (2015) Modeling the emergence of modular leadership hierarchy during 
the collective motion of herds made of harems. J Stat Phys 158: 628-646 
Page SE (2010) Diversity and Complexity Primers in Complex Systems. Princeton Univ. Press, 
New Jersey 
Pasquaretta C, Levé M, Claidière N et al (2014) Social networks in primates: smart and tolerant 
species have more efficient networks. Sci Rep 4: 7600, doi:10.1038/srep07600 
Pérez-Escudero A, Vicente-Page J, Hinz RC et al (2014) Nat. Methods 11:743-748. 
doi:10.1038/nmeth.2994 
Petit O, Bon R (2010) Decision-making processes: The case of collective movements. Behav 
Processes 84: 635-647 
Pettit B, Ákos Zs, Vicsek T et al (2015) Speed Determines Leadership and Leadership 
Determines Learning during Pigeon Flocking. Curr Biol 25: 3132-3137 
Planas I, Deneubourg J-L, Gibon C et al (2015) Group personality during collective decision-
making: a multi-level approach. Proc. R. Soc. B. 282:20142515. Doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.2515 
Pumain D, Reuillon R (2017) Urban Dynamics and Simulation Models (Lecture Notes in 
Morphogenesis). Springer, Cham, Switzerland 
Reebs SG (2000) Can a minority of informed leaders determine the foraging movements of a fish 
shoal? Anim Behav 59:403-409 
Ruderman M, Hughes-James M, Jackson S (eds) (1996) Selected Research on Work Team 
Diversity. Am. Psychol. Assoc., Washington DC 
Sapolsky RM (1983) Endocrine aspects of social instability in the olive baboon. Am. J. Primatol. 
5:365-372 
Sapolsly RM (2004) Social status and health in humans and other animals. Annu. Rev. 
Anthropol 33:393-418 
Sapolsky RM (2005) The Influence of Social Hierarchy on Primate Health. Science 
308(5722):648-652. Doi: 10.1126/science.1106477Sárová R, Spinka M, Arias  
Sarova R, Spinka M, Panama JLA et al (2010) Graded leadership by dominant animals in a herd 
of female beef cattle on pasture. Anim Behav 79:1037–1045 
Schaerf TM, Herbert-Read JE, Myerscough MR et al (2016) Identifying differences in the rules 
of interaction between individuals in moving animal groups. arXiv:1601.08202 
Smith A (1970) The Wealth of Nations. Penguin Books, Baltimore 
Strandburg-Peshkin A, Farine DR, Couzin ID et al (2015) Shared decision-making drives 
collective movement in wild baboons. Science 348(6241) 1358-1361 
75 
 
Sueur C, Petit O (2008) Organization of group members at departure is driven by social structure 
in macaca. Int J Primatol 29:1085-1098 
Surowiecki J (2005) The wisdom of crowds. Anchor, New York 
Szell M, Thurner S (2010) Measuring social dynamics in a massive multiplayer online game. 
Soc. Networks 32:313-329 
Turchin P (2003) Historical Dynamics: Why States Rise and Fall. Princeton Univ. Press, New 
Jersey 
Turchin P, Currie TE, Turner EAL et al (2013) War, space, and the evolution of Old World 
complex societies. PNAS 110(41): 16384-16389 
Turchin P, Gavrilets S (2009) Evolution of Complex Hierarchical Societies. Soc. History Evol. 
8(2): 167-198 
Uzzi B, Mukerjee S, Stringer M et al (2013) Atypical Combinations and Scientific Impact. 
Science 342:468-472 
Vicsek T (2002) Complexity: The bigger picture. Nature 418:131-131 
Vicsek T, Czirok A, Ben-Jacob E et al (1995) Novel type of phase transition in a system of self-
driven particles. Phys Rev Lett 75(6): 1226-1229 
de Waal F (2007) Chimpanzee politics: power and sex among apes. 25
th
 ed. John Hopkins Univ. 
Press, Baltimore 
Weisfeld GE, Beresford JM (1982) Erectness of posture as an indicator of dominance or success 
in humans. Motiv Emotion 6:113-131 
Whallon R, Lovis WA, Hitchcock R (eds) (2011) Information and its Role in Hunter-Gatherer 
Bands. CIoA Press, Los Angeles 
Wuchty S, Jones B, Uzzi B (2007) The Increasing Dominance of Teams in the Production of 
Knowledge. Science 316:1036-1039 
Zafeiris A, Komán Zs, Mones E et al (2017) Phenomenological theory of collective decision-
making. Phys A 479:287-298 
Zafeiris A, Vicsek T (2013) Group performance is maximized by hierarchical competence 
distribution. Nat. Commun. 4:2484 
Zhou WX, Sornette D, Hill RA et al (2005) Discrete hierarchical organization of social group 
sizes. Proc. R. Soc. B 272:439-444. Doi:10.1098/rspb.2004.2970 
  
76 
 
4 Experiments on the emergence and function 
 
By the nature of the subject, it is very difficult to obtain data about the emergence of hierarchy in 
actual living systems. In most of the cases the process is too slow, and the documentation of the 
relations among the organism is too difficult for being available in the required details. For 
example, it is clear that evolution resulted in hierarchies both concerning a single organism as 
well as a whole social community of them. The available data is more like a timeline than a set 
allowing a deeper insight into the process itself. In this Chapter we discuss two experiments 
which were used/designed to track down how a hierarchy of leader-follower relationships can 
emerge in a group of humans over a week, or even about an hour. 
4.1. The Liskaland camp experiment 
4.1.1. The Liska model of economy 
 
In his theory, Hungarian economist Tibor Liska introduced a model of a ―trans-capitalistic‖ 
socio-economic system (Liska 2006, Liska 2008). This system would be trans-capitalistic as it 
would operate in a way that is self-regulating through a ―pure‖ market and unlimited competition 
to a higher degree than present day capitalism. In this model, property itself is fully open to 
competition as gaining control over property in open competition is regarded as a fundamental 
human right. The model allows the state to have only the role of a „referee‖. Accordingly, this 
system needs a drastic reduction of the role of the public sector and it must be totally self-
controlled. The self-controlled economy would also manage redistribution, education, 
environmental problems and all other socio-economic subsystems much more efficiently than 
present-day economies. The theory envisions a society without taxation, where all income is 
fully personal and all property (that is, means of production) is social but is in personal 
stewardship. The research produced substantial results.  
In the model the means of production should be owned by those who can generate the 
maximum profit from them, so properties would be openly and freely competed for. Everybody 
must have the right and the option to become a runner in this competition starting from a base 
level and, depending on his/her performance, can move forward. To achieve this goal, a new 
form of ownership was proposed: it is termed personal social ownership. It stands between 
private ownership and tenancy-type holding of property, while its status is significantly closer to 
private ownership. On the basis of personal social ownership, the bidder who guarantees the 
maximum of long-term profits will be selected for the position as owner, under the condition that 
he/she can keep this position only as long as he produces the maximum of long-term profits.  
The basic principle is that anyone has the right to make decisions and his further possibilities 
should depend on the result.  According to Liska, ―…systems in which one decides and others 
bear the cost of the decision are not desirable‖. The model assumes that people want to arrange 
their own things and do not like if others tell them what to do. While the other expectations of 
the model are justifiable relatively easily, this one is an exception. There are numerous people 
who do not like to make decisions even concerning their own interests. They prefer to follow a 
leader who tells them what is right and what is wrong.  
From among the elements of the model, the two most essential have been elaborated in 
precise detail.  
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- Social inheritance means that the income produced by one generation will be 
redistributed among the members of the next generation, which would also guarantee the 
most efficient way of spending money.  
- Personal social ownership would meet the selection criteria of putting the right man in 
the right place, the right man being the person who is able to manage the property in the 
most profitable way.  
 
 
4.1.2 The experiment 
 
Due to the above mentioned tendency of people trying to follow those who they think are better 
at making good decisions, we expect that in a simple realization of the ―Liska economy‖ a 
system of leader-follower relationships is gradually built up. Such a highly simplified version 
took place in a 2012 summer camp called ―Liskaland‖ for participants coming with various 
backgrounds (the related results – see below – have not been published). The camp is a mini-
society following the rules of the Liska model. Participants had to make financial decisions and 
competed to gain more ―öki‖ – the currency of the camp, with those turning out after a week to 
be the most successful ones winning prizes. In the Liska model, certain rules of the game are set, 
but otherwise there is an extremely minimal role of the state and the public sector, and an 
emphasis on unlimited market competition (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). The participants of 
the camp could bid for ownership of certain enterprises on the first day of the camp. During the 
camp these enterprises provided basically all of the services, such as accommodation, food, etc. 
Nothing was for free – participants had to buy these services. They also had to organize the 
functioning of these services (as owners of the services or as paid helpers of the owners). The 
camp lasted for 8 days. Each day of the camp simulated 1 year, so events happened fast, with 
enterprises switching often between owners. Financial decisions had to be made in situations 
where there were several uncertain factors (what will be the income of the enterprise, etc.). 
Further details can be found in Liska (2011). 
Dataset — 96 people (mainly university students) participated in the camp, 82 of them were 
competitors, the rest took part as organizers and as workers in the ―state‖ companies, such as the 
bank. On the first day the competitors were asked to fill out a questionnaire, and 73 of them filled 
it out. Average age of the respondents was 22 (Mones et al. 2013). 
In case of a range of monetary transactions competitors had to check into a computer system 
with username and password to manage their transactions. At this point they were presented with 
questions on the computer monitor regarding their decision making. They were offered pen-
drives as incentives to answer the questions and the camp leaders also repeatedly asked 
participants to help the research. As additional incentive, those who cooperated were offered 
information on how many other people marked them in their own replies to these questions. In 
this paper, we concentrate on answers to the following query: ―Whose decisions did you follow 
(by making similar decisions) – when making economic and other decisions?‖ Participants were 
given this information linked to the question: ―Following someone‘s decision means that you 
have reached a decision, because you found out about that persons decision and you chose to do 
in similar fashion.‖ As answer they could choose one or more people from the participants of the 
camp. 72% of the competitors answered the questions at least once during the camp. 
Local reaching centrality — A directed network was then built based on the answers. In the 
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network, each node represents a participant and there is an edge pointing from A to B if 
participant B followed the decision of participant A (i.e., B marked A in the questionnaire), see 
Fig. 4.1. As a simple filtering procedure, the participants who were chosen by a single participant 
but did not choose anyone were removed, thus reducing the effect of incidental answers. In order 
to describe the influence of each participant, the local reaching centralities, CR(i) were calculated 
(see Sect. 2.1.2). 
 
4.1.3 Results 
 
Hierarchical layout — Visualization of the hierarchical relations inside the network of decisions 
based on following the others is based on the distribution of CR(i) (see Sect. 2.1.2) .  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Network of leader-follower relationships corresponding to the directed interactions between the 
participants of the ―Liskaland‖ experiment. The graph in a was generated by the approach reviewed in the 
visualization part. Reproduced from Nepusz and Vicsek (2013). In b the uppermost part of the whole network is 
shown, while c shows the corresponding ID-s, reaching centralities and final ranks of the participants. 
Visualization was made according to Sect. 2.2.2.  
 
In Fig. 4.2, we plot the histogram of the local reaching centrality of the Liskaland network in 
comparison with those of the random network. The random network (Erdős–Rényi graph) is 
generated by taking N number of nodes and adding M number of directed edges between 
randomly chosen nodes (with uniform distribution), where N and M are the number of nodes and 
edges in the Liskaland network. The corresponding distribution of the random network is 
determined from the average of   6 realizations. It is obvious that the distribution of CR(i) in the 
Liskaland network is more heterogeneous, having a high peak at very small values and 
decreasing slowly. This means that most of the participants do not have influence on the others. 
However, there is a small fraction of the participants that have large local reaching centrality. On 
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the contrary, the distribution of CR(i)s in the random graph is dominated by the peak at large 
values, meaning that most of the nodes can reach a very large portion of the graph. This suggests 
that the role of participants in the Liskaland network is more heterogeneous compared to the 
random graph, which is a sign of the hierarchical organization. The above observation is also 
confirmed by the global reaching centrality values: for the Liskaland network,   
(𝐿 𝑠𝑘 𝑙 𝑛𝑑)  
  6 8 while for the random network,   
(  𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚)     9  with a standard deviation of     7. 
The statistics on the random graph is obtained by a sample of the size   6. This means that the 
experimentally observed network is more hierarchical than a corresponding random graph with a 
significance level of more than 99.9%.  
 
 
4.2 Picturask 
 
4.2.1 The “game” 
 
Next we discuss an experiment named as Picturask (Mones et al. 2015) which was conducted 
over the Internet. The subjects participated in a game, where everyone had to take part in a 
common task (estimating the number of circles in an image), and the players were able to see the 
guesses of the others by clicking on the other players' tiles (displayed on the screen in order to 
inform the players about their performance). The player's actions through the game had been 
recorded, and these records were later used to inference the behaviour of the players. After the 
game, deep interviews were conducted with some of the players to see if the quantitative 
evaluations were in agreement with the players' intentions. 
From social psychological aspects the players in the game form a small group structure 
which can be characterized by interdependence where individuals act in a common interpersonal 
space, while they influence each other's actions in a special way (Johnson and Johnson 2005). In 
this Picturask, this space is somewhat artificial because it is determined by the rules of the game; 
for example direct communication was not allowed: players could only see the others' 
Fig. 4.2 Distribution of the 
reaching centrality values 
for the network of 
interacting participants and 
for a random network of the 
same size 
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anonymized guesses. It depended on the player whether he/she considered and/or accepted the 
tip of a number of selected other players as an advice. 
This setting is similar to the one considered in social exchange theory (Cropanzano and 
Mitchell 2005) where the subject of interaction is the information about each other's tips. Players 
gain this information from the colour of the tiles therefore tiles can be identified as heuristics. 
The theory of heuristics describes the stereotyping pattern of human being where a complex 
question may be often answered with a simplifying method – like players tend to judge a tip 
based on the colour of tiles (darker is better). 
Altogether 170 users signed up for the game of which 96 participated in more than 90% of 
the turns. The majority (89%) of the players were of age 18 to28, thus 65% of them received at 
least bachelor's degree or equivalent, and33% accomplished high school. 56% of the players 
were female. Subjects were divided into three groups to play the game, each group playing on 
different weeks, for three consecutive days. Participation was encouraged by a 2000HUF reward. 
(Equivalent to 6.7 EUR, approximately 1% of average salary in Hungary). Four players with the 
best results were assured to get special awards as motivation. 
 
4.2.2 Methods 
 
A player participated in the experiment on-line, from home, or from any other place, they could 
have access to the World Wide Web. The game was based on standard LAMP architecture, and 
players were able to participate through a standard Internet browser. The competition involved 
making 45 decisions/guesses and took less than an hour per session. Sessions were arranged 3 
times per week and each starting at 7p.m. over a time interval of 3 weeks. 
During the game the participants were asked to make a simple estimation: they had to guess 
the number of bubbles on randomly generated images (Fig. 4.3). As the game advanced, the 
correct answer changed with a relatively slow frequency in order to mimic the collective decision 
making process modelled by Nepusz and Vicsek (2013). The actual number of circles changed 
once in five turns, even though this was unknown for the players. Whilst answering, the player 
could reveal the previous answer of a maximum of 10 other players in each turn by clicking on 
its tile (Fig. 4.4). This act was considered as ―asking for advice‖, and the player being asked was 
called advisor. One of the motivations for this process was to see if the results of the related 
agent-based simulations (Nepusz and Vicsek (2013), Sect. 5.1) could be reproduced in real life. 
 
Fig. 4.3 This is a sample picture 
illustrating the one shown to the players 
who have to guess the interval between 
two numbers (see Fig.4.4) into which the 
number of coloured disks falls. 
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Depending on the ratio of advices that turned out to be correct, the tiles of the rivals became 
darker, indicating those advisors who gave the player the best advices. The estimated knowledge 
(the ratio of correct advices) was also displayed on the rival tile, but no other information was 
available. In fact, the rivals were displayed in a random permutation for each player in order to 
avoid potential biases introduced by the order of the tiles (Fig. 4.4). 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4 Snapshots of the Picturask interface. The task was to estimate the number of circles shown for a limited 
time (5 seconds). On the answering interface (above), users were allowed to find out the previous answer of 
selected (by them, and at most 10) other users. They were provided by a panel of the others (Other users) which 
also displayed the success ratio of the previously inquired users encoded in the colour of each tile. Inquired 
advices were displayed in the Advice panel. 
 
For the analysis of the game logs various methods were used in order to represent the social 
structure at the end of the game by a graph. In this graph nodes represented the players, and a 
directed edge indicated a leader-follower type relation between the players: in the case the source 
node often asked advice from the target node the direction of the edge pointed from the target to 
the source node (Fig. 4.5). Global reaching centrality (GRC) was used to quantitatively describe 
the level of hierarchy in the resulting networks. Importantly, GRC was significantly higher in 
real setups than in those with a randomized version of the corresponding networks or the 
randomized control experiments. 
 
4.2.3 Results 
 
The primary conjecture about the experiments was that since the less well performing players 
would prefer to ask the advices of better performing individuals, they would voluntarily arrange 
themselves into a hierarchical network. Therefore, out of the nine games, two were so-called 
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control experiments, where the advices provided were randomized thus eliminating apparent 
differences in performance between players. 
It is worth mentioning that although the resulting structures in the real and control 
experiments were rather different, the majority of the players did not notice any difference 
between the true and the scrambled games/guesses. This is likely to indicate the existence of a 
characteristic time that is necessary to discover differences in performance; otherwise the social 
structure remains random. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 Hierarchical structure of the leader-follower relationships. Two illustrative examples of the structures 
that emerged during the game as players queried advice from others: a Game 6 (regular experiment) and b Game 
9 (control experiment). Colour intensity indicates the performance of the users, and edges pointing upward in the 
network are drawn in red colour. As the structure of the consecutive levels indicates, the network of influences in 
the regular experiments features hierarchical characteristics in contrast to the one found in the control 
experiment. Visualization was made according to Sect. 2.2.2. 
 
 
Based on the interviews made after the 9 sessions had been over, it became clear that there 
had been three main stages of decision making in Picturask. First, the player makes an initial 
guess, then he/she collects information from others, at the end of the 1 minute given for an 
answer the player makes a final decision using the information collected from others. It is 
important to separate information gathering from the decision making process. 
The only information a player new about the others was the colour of the tile corresponding 
to the ratio of correct advices by the person represented by the tile. Even if the players did not 
understand what the exact meaning of the tile was, they used it as a heuristic: linking good 
performance with the colour of the tile. Thus, the colour had two functions: in most cases, it 
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indicated the pool of possible advice givers and the order of asking advice (the darker is better), 
but it also could give more weight to the advice of some players. 
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5. Modelling emergence and control 
 
In this Chapter we shall consider some of the dynamical aspects of hierarchical systems as 
obtained from simulations of the related models. Although the emergence of hierarchy and the 
optimal ways of controlling the processes in a hierarchical structure represent two of the most 
relevant aspects of the subject of hierarchy, the related results are far from being complete. 
Further research in these directions is of essential importance.  
Relation to game theory: In the related works emergence is typically considered as a result 
of optimizing a quantity which is called by various names (e.g., performance, effectiveness) but 
is analogous to the notion of fitness. And, much like in game theory, fitness has a positive 
ingredient (benefits) and a negative part associated with disadvantages (costs). Although the 
models we discuss can be mapped onto games, our preference will be using the language and the 
techniques of networks, agent based modelling and statistical mechanics.  
 
5.1 Emergence of hierarchy in model systems  
 
This section is about approaches involving simple models that are capable of reproducing the 
emergence of multi-level network structures based on the degree to which the units (individuals) 
are able to contribute to the efficiency (capacity to operate on a high level) of the system. We 
shall adopt terminologies that are, on one hand, used in statistical mechanics and network 
science, while, on the on the other hand, being typically used in the context of organizations and 
the underlying networks of collaborations. However, we expect this framework to be applicable 
to a significantly larger class of systems. Thus we consider the groups of humans as a paradigm, 
but our approach is so general that it is expected to be applicable to simpler systems such as 
groups of collaborating animals (apes, wolfs, etc.) as well as complex machines constructed by 
people. 
There are only relatively few works on how a hierarchical network structure emerges. We 
first briefly discuss two works that describe the emergence of networks which have undirected 
edges only, but can be considered to be hierarchical from the point self-similarity. Mengistu et al. 
(2016) investigate the changing structure of networks using evolutionary arguments. They 
evolved graphs which can be regarded as computational abstractions of animal brains. Such 
structures are commonly called artificial neural networks (ANNs) and can solve hierarchical 
Boolean logic problems (Fig. 5.1). Evolving the ANNs with or without a cost for network 
connections leads to qualitatively different results. Specifically, the experimental treatment 
selects for maximizing performance and minimizing connection costs (performance and 
connection cost, P&CC), whereas the control treatment selects for performance only 
(performance alone, PA)  
A comparison of the evolved networks (under varying conditions) resulted in the conclusion 
that the P&CC networks are significantly more hierarchical, modular, than those of the P&A 
ones and solve significantly more sub-problems.  
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Fig 5.1 The main hypothesis. Evolution with selection for performance only results in non-hierarchical and non-
modular networks, which take longer to adapt to new environments. Evolving networks with a connection cost, 
however, create hierarchical and functionally modular networks that can solve the overall problem by recursively 
solving its sub-problems. These networks also adapt to new environments faster. Reproduced from Mengistu et al. 
(2016) 
 
Lee et al. (2011) used a game theoretical type model to investigate how social structures 
emerge. In their approach, a number of feedback couplings from the behaviour of the agents to 
their environment was assumed, and this is why it could be considered as a multiadaptive game. 
The expressions they used were relatively simple – and somewhat arbitrary – still the resulting 
behaviour of the network of agents was very rich since even the strategies of the agents were 
evolving as a function of their interaction network configurations. In one of the phases the 
simulated networks had the scaling of the distribution P(k) of the degrees k of the nodes as well 
as the clustering coefficient C(k) as a function of the degree of the nodes. Here C(k) is the 
average of the ratio of the triangles around a given node to the total number of potential 
triangles). Such a simultaneous scaling was showed by Ravasz et al. (2002) to correspond to a 
self-similar structure. Since the edges were undirected we consider this type of self-similarity as 
a less pronounced manifestation of hierarchy then the one based on directed flows. 
Now we turn to discussing directed hierarchical networks. Corominas-Muntra et al. (2013) 
do not discuss realistic criteria leading to emergence, but their work is still interesting from the 
point of our subject. They consider a set of possible mechanisms leading to a very wide set of 
potentially realizable hierarchical structures with directed edges. Four major kinds of hierarchies 
were identified by analysing the large voids in the morphospace defined by the authors. Two of 
them matched those structures what were expected from random networks with similar 
connectivity, thus suggesting that nonadaptive factors were at work. Ecological and gene 
networks define the other two domains, indicating that their topological order is the result of 
functional constraints. We presented more features of these results in a different context in Sect. 
2.1.3. 
Next we describe in more detail a model which was designed to investigate how 
advantageous leader-follower relations result in the emergence of hierarchy in the presence of a 
changing environment (Nepusz and Vicsek 2013) 
 
The assumptions of the model were the following: 
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i) A group of people is embedded in a changing environment. Better adaptation (by which 
we mean the ability of finding out about the new conditions as quickly as possible) 
represents one of the core advantages an individual can have.  
ii) The individuals possess different abilities to hold on in such a constantly varying 
environment on their own,  
iii) The actors constantly monitor the decisions of their group mates which observations alter 
their own decisions. The effect on their own decisions is proportional to the degree to 
which they trust the judgment of that certain other group member, as compared to their 
own level of competence. The degree of trust is dependent on the prior success of the 
observed group mates. 
iv) Maintaining a connection with another group member has a cost (effort).  
 
Once the above assumptions are integrated into a set of rules that are corresponding to a 
game theoretic-like, stochastic model, a collaboration structure emerges in which the leader-
follower relationships manifest themselves in the form of a multi-level, hierarchical network. 
This network is at the same time both stable and sensitive to the changes in the environment, 
according to which it is capable to re-wire itself in a dynamic fashion. Omitting any of the above 
four assumptions leads to the loss of the emergence of the multi-level, hierarchical structure. 
 
The main steps of the decision making process are:  
 
1. The state of the environment is simply given by a value of either 1, 2 …or l. After the 
state assumes one of these values it sticks to it and changes to a randomly selected 
other state only with a probability p. where p is in the range of 0.05-0.2. 
 
2. The actors have different abilities to find out the state of the environment (that is, to 
―adopt‖ to the environment), described by a pre-defined parameter taking values from 
the [0, 1] interval according to some distribution. In each turn, the guess of each 
individual is based on the weighted average of (i) its own estimation, and (ii) its 
interactions with the other k=1, 2,…,m most trusted other actors. (k typically ranges 
between 2 and 7). 
 
3. In each round, after each agent has finished with the decision making, the actual state 
of the environment is revealed, letting the actors finding out which one of them has 
made the correct decision and which one of them made the incorrect estimate. 
 
4. Based on the above information the so called ‗trust matrix‘ (T(i,j))is updated, in which 
the values correspond to the degree to which actor i trusts actor j. This trust is 
proportional to the number of rounds agent i made use of the estimate of agent j in a 
way that the guess of agent j contributed positively to the guess of agent i. Accordingly, 
the trust-level of an individual is based on his/her prior performance. Agents that are 
more trusted are ―listened to‖ more frequently.  
 
By iterating the above steps, the dynamics of the system typically converges to a trust matrix 
in which the values depend on the original abilities of the actors in a non-trivial way. A typical 
run starts with a uniform trust matrix (except for the values in the diagonal positions) converging 
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to a state that corresponds to a much better performing set of interactions and a hierarchical 
structure (See Fig. 5.2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.2 The dynamics of the model as a function of time and noise for various ability distributions. Each column 
represents a different ability distribution with the same mean and a variance. The distributions are: (i) constant,(ii) 
normal, (iii) log-normal and (iv) power-law respectively. The upper row corresponds to the noiseless case; whereas 
the middle one corresponds to 20% relative noise, where noise stands for randomly perturbing the decisions directly 
following from the rules of the model. The middle and the bottommost curves correspond to two different hierarchy 
measures: (1) fraction of forward arcs and (2) global reaching centrality (GRC). In both cases the hierarchy level is 
expressed as numbers between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to ―no hierarchy‖, and 1 corresponds to ―maximal 
hierarchy‖. The topmost lines (small red circles) show the improvement of the overall performance. Reproduced 
from Nepusz and Vicsek (2013). 
 
 
To create a graph from the trust matrix the following procedure is made: each agent is a 
node in the graph and the weight of the edge (reflecting how much actor i trusts actor j) is the 
element (i,j) in the matrix. Only the strongest ties are taken into account in the network. The 
resulting graphs have a hierarchical structure with multiple levels in them (Fig. 5.3). These 
structures emerge in time, as depicted in Fig. 5.2 and, in which two complementary hierarchy 
measures are shown: the ‗global reaching centrality‘, GRC, proposed by (Mones et al. 2012), and 
the normalized fraction of forward arcs, defined by (Eades et al. 1993). Both measures are 
discussed in detail in Sect. 2.1.2.  
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Fig. 5.3 An early, less stable state of the emerging hierarchical network (a) and a more stable (b), persistent solution 
corresponding to the local maximum of performance of the network showing the nodes copying decisions (indicated 
by arrows) of the other members of the group. The numbers (environment) to be guessed are denoted by colours. 
Network (b) is reminiscent of the experimental result displayed in Fig 4.1. a. 
 
Thus, the actors in the model show a strong tendency to structure themselves into a 
multilevel hierarchical organization that – apart from being a commonly seen, is an ―intuitively 
natural‖ form of self-organization – which has recently gained support from a human experiment 
as well, called ―Liskaland‖ (see Sect. 4.1) 
 
5.2 The complex efficiency landscape of hierarchical organizations 
 
In this section the emergence of optimal network structures is discussed using an approach which 
is reminiscent of the one introduced by statistical physicists in order to interpret complex systems 
using relatively simple rules of units and interactions. The original – so called spin-glass – 
approach assumes spin states (up or down) in the nodes of a network. The interaction along the 
edges is randomly ferromagnetic or antiferromagnetic and the configuration of the network is 
fixed and ranges from lattices (Edwards and Anderson 1975), through scale-free (Kim et al. 
2005) to full graph (Sherrington and Kirckpatrick 1975).  
The essential new feature of the treatment we describe below is that instead of optimizing by 
looking for a locally optimal state of the spins in the nodes of a pre-defined network, optimal 
networks are searched with the states of the nodes being fixed. Thus, the approach represents 
searching for extrema – as a function of the underlying network topology – in the complex 
efficiency landscape. In addition to the above (ferromagnetic or antiferromagnetic links), in 
contrast to spin-glass models, the edges in the underlying network of interactions have a 
direction. 
The sign associated with an edge corresponds to collaboration (positive) or antagonistic 
(negative) relations. Searching for optimal states then is carried out by modifying the network 
topology so that both the collaborating partners (within an organization) and the flow of 
influences result in a maximal efficiency.  
Within such an approach it is possible to address the question of the spontaneous emergence 
of hierarchical networks displaying behaviours some of which are analogous to those of glasses. 
By glassy behaviour we mean that while we are searching for a stable state, our structures do not 
converge to a unique network with a well-defined extremal value of their efficiency (an analogue 
of the energy in the physics literature). Instead, glassy systems ―freeze‖ into various disordered 
structures representing local extrema full of strains or frustrations. 
5.2.1 Modelling organizations 
 
The relations in an organization can be represented by a network made of directed edges 
corresponding to the leader-follower relations in the system. In this approach the ability of 
member i to contribute to the effectiveness of the organization is denoted by ai. In an ideal case 
the direction of an edge between members i and j would point from i to j if ai > aj (it is 
advantageous and is typically indeed the case that agents with higher abilities can enforce their 
decisions on agents with smaller abilities, i.e., occupy a higher position within the organizational 
hierarchy). However, with some finite probability, in a realistic case a proportion p of all of the 
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links between two members points from the less knowledgeable to the more knowledgeable 
person (Zamani and Vicsek 2017).  
Next, it is assumed that on an absolute value scale the contribution of the members is 
between 0 and 1. In addition, the joint contribution of two members Eeff,ij is linearly proportional 
to their abilities, i.e., Eeff,(i,j)= ai aj. However – and this is an essential point, when one considers 
the relations of sophisticated creatures – the interaction between two individuals can be both 
harmonic and antagonistic with probabilities (1-q) and q, respectively. In the ―harmonic‖ case, 
the contribution of the two members is positive, on the other hand, if they are in an antagonistic 
relation their interaction will result in a decrease of the total efficiency, thus their interaction 
enters the expression for the efficiency as negative contribution.  
Assuming that the total performance of the organization can be represented as the 
contribution of the pairwise interactions it follows that 
 
 
    (   )     ∑   (   )    
 
  
 
(5.1) 
 
with the summation running over nodes that have at least one incoming or outgoing edge. 
(Remark: in the original publication 1/N was used for normalizing the efficiency, however, 1/M 
is a more appropriate quantity for this purpose.) According to the above arguments about the 
possible relations between two interacting members, we assume that Jij can be equal to 1 or -1. 
For the ai values it is quite natural to use randomly generated numbers on the unit interval 
following a bounded log-normal distribution (which can be argued to be characteristic for the 
outputs of complex entities).  
The sign of Jij  and the direction of the edge ij are decided by two factors: 1) whether the ij 
edge points from the larger to the lower ability of the participants i and j and 2) whether these 
participants are compatible or antagonistic. Thus, (with the corresponding probabilities)  
 
i) Jij =1 if the ij edge points from a node with larger ability to a smaller (ai > aj  and the two 
individuals cooperate (and Jij = - 1 otherwise) 
 
ii) Jij = - 1 if the ij edge points from a node with smaller ability towards a larger one and the two 
individuals are antagonistic (and Jij = 1 otherwise) 
 
iii) If there is no edge between i and j then Jij = 0.  
 
iv) A further essential restriction has to be taken into account to make the system more realistic 
(much like as it was described in Sect. 5.1). In addition to the above, it should also be required 
that the total number of edges of a node cannot exceed a pre-defined value. 
 
5.2.2 Simulations and results 
 
The numerical experiments start out with a full graph with N nodes each associated with a 
constant ability ai  and with edges pointing towards lower ability sites from larger ability ones 
with a probability 1-p. In addition, 1 or - 1 is associated with each edge, independent of their 
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direction (however, because of the term 1-p, the number of negative edges for small p will occur 
in larger overall number for the ai > aj cases (than for ai < aj) so that the efficiency values and the 
structure of the graph become coupled. 
The next step is searching for locally optimal networks. This will be a particular subgraph 
containing M edges within the full graph of N nodes, where N is the total number of possible 
members and M is the actual one. The initial configuration is a random connected subgraph of 
3N edges. Throughout the calculations, the number of edges within the subgraphs satisfy the 
criteria that in average the ratio of edges in them pointing from a site with larger to a smaller 
ability will be equal to 1-p and the number of antagonistic interactions Jij = -1 will be, again, in 
average, qM ( for  ai < aj). The searching is much like a Monte Carlo simulation, where 
efficiency plays the role of energy times -1. In each step a randomly selected edge is eliminated 
and next two random nodes are chosen which are not yet connected by one of the M-1 edges. 
The sign and the direction of the new edge, Jij is chosen according to conditions i)-iv) outlined in 
the Sect. 5.2.1. A randomly generated new edge is accepted if it results in an increasing 
efficiency and is also accepted with a small probability of it decreases the efficiency 
Repeating the procedure results in a distribution of the individually obtained locally optimal 
efficiencies. The corresponding histogram (probability density function –  PDF) can be 
constructed for various N values to see the size effect. The properties of the networks 
corresponding to the locally optimal states were also investigated from the point of their 
hierarchical nature using the GRC measure (see Fig. 5.4).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.4 Distribution of the local maxima of the efficiency values (a) and Global Reaching Centrality (GRC) values 
(b) for the locally optimal states. Averaging over the initial full graph (250 initial full graphs and for each initial full 
graph we have 250 local optimal states) of N nodes and the initial subgraphs of 3N edges and for p=q=0.2 was 
carried out. There is an overall tendency of the PDF-s as a function of the system size. GRC and the average 
efficiency grows with increasing N. Reproduced from Zamani and Vicsek (2017). 
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In Fig. 5.4 a few characteristic dependences of the related networks are depicted. Fig. 5.4 a 
shows that larger systems are likely to be more efficient, while Fig. 5.4 b shows that for larger 
networks the optimal configurations seem to fall into two classes with one having a smaller and 
another one a distinctly more hierarchical structure. In order to illustrate the variety of the 
optimal structures, in Fig 5.4 a number of typical examples are shown. These include smaller and 
larger networks (N=16, N=128), networks for smaller or larger GRC for p=q=0.2. For 
visualization we use the method described in detail in Sect. 2.2.2.  
According to the above results, the structures of the obtained networks (Fig 5.5) are such 
that they possess the two, perhaps most important features of complex systems: a simultaneous 
presence of adaptability and stability. Stability is associated with the presence of a local 
optimum. Only significant perturbations can ―kick out‖ a given arrangement of the participants 
from this favourable state. However, if the perturbation is large enough (the external conditions 
change significantly) the network can adapt itself and settle into an alternative, more optimal 
configuration that suits the new conditions better. The efficiency of the hierarchical structure is 
higher than a randomly chosen sum of the contributions of the pairwise interactions. These 
features are in an analogy with those of the glasses including spin glasses. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.5 Hierarchical graphs in selected local optimal states of networks. Number of nodes is N=128, the other two 
parameters are p=q=0.2, a: GRC = 0.62, b: GRC=0.25. Reproduced from Zamani and Vicsek (2017). 
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5.3 Controlling hierarchical networks  
 
In this section we shall overview two approaches from a field which – although very important – 
for some reason have been overlooked by researchers in the last decades: the controllability 
properties of complex networks. This field is about the study of the conditions under which a 
network can be driven from any initial state into any final state within finite number of steps.  
This definition implies that the nodes have a state, for example the amount of traffic flowing 
through a node in, say, a traffic or communication network, or the transcription factor 
concentration in a gene regulatory graph. The question is that how and where one has to 
intervene in order to drive the system into a desired (pre-defined) condition. 
5.3.1 Structural controllability – controlling nodes 
 
The first approach, proposed by Liu et al. (2011), investigates the controllability properties of 
weighted directed networks. The main idea is to identify a set of the so called driver nodes (a set 
of vertices through which the dynamics of the entire system can be controlled). The nodes of the 
network are assumed to behave according to non-linear processes, but their behaviour is 
approximated by the following linear dynamics: 
 
   ⃗( )
  
   ⃗( )    ⃗⃗( ) 
(5.2) 
 
where  ⃗( )  (  ( )     ( ))
 is the state vector of the N nodes (in which xi(t) describes 
the state of node i at time t), A is the N×N adjacency matrix, capturing the interaction strength 
among the elements of the systems (which are the nodes of the graph), and B is an N×M matrix 
defining the driver nodes: these are the vertices which are to be controlled from the outside in 
order to drive the system to the desired state. Finally,  ⃗⃗( )  (  ( )     ( ))
  is the time-
dependent input signal, the vector controlling the system. The justification of this approximation 
is that according to Slotine and Li (1991), the controllability of a nonlinear system is in many 
aspects structurally similar to that of a linear system. 
A dynamics (A, B) is said to be ―structurally controllable‖ if it is possible to choose the non-
zero elements in A and B in a way that the network can be driven from any state to any other 
final state by appropriately choosing the elements of  ⃗⃗. This property, structural controllability, 
is important, because in real-life complex systems the weights of A (the link weights of the 
network) are usually unknown, or just partly known. A structurally controllable system can be 
shown to be controllable for almost all weight combinations, thus this property helps to 
overcome the incomplete knowledge of the link weights in A. Then, the minimum number of 
driver nodes is determined by the maximum matching in the graph, which is a maximal set of 
links that do not share start or end vertices. A node is matched, if an edge in the maximum 
matching points at it, otherwise it is unmatched. Then, from here, the task is basically solved, 
because according to Yu el al (2010), full control can be gained over a directed network if and 
only if each unmatched node is directly controlled and there are directed paths from the input 
signals to all matched vertices. 
The key results of this study are the following: (See also Table 5.1) 
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 The number of driver nodes within a complex network is mainly determined by the 
network‘s degree distribution. 
 Sparse inhomogeneous networks (a type of graph very often seen in relation to real-life 
complex systems, often the ones that have evolved to control another underlying process 
such as a transcriptional regulatory network) are the most difficult to control (they need 
many input signals.) 
 In contrast, dense and homogeneous graphs need only a few driver nodes in order to be 
controlled 
 And finally, the most counterintuitive result is that the driver nodes tend to avoid the 
high-degree nodes (―hubs‖), both in model and real-life systems. In other words, control 
signals control the hubs only indirectly, which is, according to Nepusz and Vicsek 
(2012), due to the fact that in this approach the driver nodes are not able to control their 
subordinate vertices independently from each other. 
 
Importantly, these results apply for linear nodal dynamics. 
 
5.3.2. Switchboard dynamics – controlling edges 
 
Nepusz and Vicsek (2012) proposed a dynamics that takes place on the edges, instead of the 
nodes, and leads to significantly different controllability properties for the same real-life 
networks. The motivation is visualized in Fig. 5.6 demonstrating that hierarchical networks – in 
case the nodes are directly controlled by one of their neighbours or by driver nodes – need a 
disproportionally large number of driver nodes. In this model the state variables correspond to 
the edges of a directed complex network, and the vertices of the network act as linear operators 
that map state variables of inbound edges to outbound edges. It is called switchboard dynamics, 
exactly because of this property: each node acts as a ―switchboard-like device‖ mapping the 
signals coming from the inbound edges to the outbound edges, by applying a linear operator 
called mixing, or switching matrix. That is, each node has a separate switching matrix, Mi, 
enabling the nodes to control their subordinates separately.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5.6 When node controllability is considered, a given node can influence the state of only one of its neighbours. 
This needs a relatively large number of nodes to be controlled from ―outside‖ (denoted by wavy lines). Thus, an 
alternative approach may be more efficient. Reproduced from Nepusz and Vicsek (2012). 
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This arrangement is reminiscent of the characteristics of many real-life networks in which 
each node constantly processes information coming from its inbound edges and forwards them in 
a differentiated way via its outbound edges. A plausible example can be an arbitrary social 
communication network in which the nodes are the persons who constantly receive and forward 
messages, but in ways depending on the recipient. 
In this switchboard dynamics framework (SBD), each edge has a state, which is denoted by 
the  ⃗  [  ] state vector. For each i node belongs a  ⃗ 
  and  ⃗ 
  vector pair, consisting of those xj 
edge-state values that correspond to the incoming and outgoing edges, respectively, of node i. 
For example in Fig. 5.7 a, the inbound edges of node i are c and d, whose states are defined by 
the values of xc and xd, whereas its outbound edges, e, f, and g, are in the state described by the 
values xe, xf and xg, respectively. The switching matrix of this node, Mi, has three rows (out-
degree, number of out-going edges) and two columns (in-degree, number of incoming edges). 
The dynamics is controlled from the outside by adding an offset vector (or control signal)  ⃗⃗  to 
the state vectors of the outgoing edges of node i, marked with red undulate arrows on Fig 5.7 a.  
The dynamics of the network is described by the following equation: 
 
   ⃗ 
 
  
     ⃗ 
 ( )         
 ( )     ⃗⃗ ( ) 
(5.3) 
 
where σi is 1 if node i is a driver node (see Sect. 5.3.1), and 0 otherwise. The vector τi includes 
damping terms corresponding to the edges in  ⃗ 
 (t), and finally , denotes the entry-wise 
product of two vectors being of the same size. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.7 a The dynamics of the 
system in the switchboard dynamics 
framework is controlled by adding 
an offset vector  ⃗⃗  to the state 
vectors of the outgoing edges of 
node i (marked with red undulate 
arrows). In case this vector is not a 
null-vector, node i is a driver node. 
b The state of an arbitrary edge j 
originating in node r and 
terminating in vertex s depends only 
on itself, xj, and on the states 
belonging to the inbound edges of 
node r, that is, on the set   ⃗ 
 . 
  
 
 
In order to simplify the equation, the state variables and control signals are implicitly 
considered as time-dependent, even if the time variable is omitted. By re-writing (5.3) in terms of 
xi, the dynamics of the system yields a more simplified form (5.4): 
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 ∑  𝑘  𝑘
𝑘   
 
       𝑠   
(5.4) 
 
where wkj is an element of the switching matrix Mr belonging to node r defining the information 
process between the inbound edge k and the outbound edge j. Note that the set Γj
-
 includes all the 
state variables on which the derivative of the state variable   ̇ depends on, since it is effected 
only by itself, xj, and on the states of the edges ending on node r, that is, on  ⃗ 
 :   
  { ⃗ 
    }  
By defining all the values in Mr which do not affect the state of xj as zero (that is, those wkj 
values which are not in the set Γj
-
), we get (5.5) 
 
  ̇  (   ) ⃗    ⃗⃗ (5.5) 
 
where the W, T and H matrices are: 
 
 W=[wkj], where wkj can be non-zero if and only if the end-point of edge k is the 
staring node of edge j.  
 The diagonal matrix T=[τjj] contains the damping terms related to the edges, and 
 H is also a diagonal matrix in which the jth diagonal element is σs, if edge j 
originates in node s.  
 
(5.5) basically describes a simple linear time-invariant dynamical system in which W is the 
adjacency matrix of the line graph L(G) of the original graph G. This means that each node in 
L(G) corresponds to an edge in G, as it is demonstrated on an example graph on Fig. 5.8 a and b.  
By applying the maximum matching theorem, in the spirit as it was done in the structural 
controllability framework by Liu et al. (2011), we get a set of control paths and driven nodes in 
the line graph L(G). Note that these are at the same time driven edges in the original graph G, 
that is, a set of edges whose state should be modified in order to gain control over the network. 
Since edges can only be controlled from the nodes they are originated, this set of edges define 
the set of driver nodes as well: these are the vertices from which at least one driven edge 
originates from. As it is proven in Nepusz and Vicsek (2012), the minimal set of driver nodes in 
a graph G can then be determined by selecting those vertices in G for which dv
+
>dv
-
 , and one 
arbitrary vertex from each ‗balanced component‘. (Balanced component is a connected 
component consisting only of nodes for which dv
+
=dv
-
 , and above this, contains at least one 
edge.) 
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Fig. 5.8 Demonstration of how the switchboard dynamics approach pinpoints the driver nodes. a a simple input 
network G with six nodes and nine edges. The control applies to the edges of the network, instead of the nodes. b 
The line graph L(G) corresponding to G. A linear time-invariant dynamics on the nodes of L(G) is equivalent to 
the switchboard dynamics in G. Node labels refer to the endpoints of the edges in G. c The maximum matching 
theorem applied to L(G) returning disjoint control paths. d The control paths in G, inferred from the results 
yielded on L(G). Note how each path in the line graph L(G) became an edge-disjoint walk in G. Numbers on the 
lines represent the order in which the edges have to be traversed in the walks. The two driver nodes are a and e 
since each walk starts from either one of them. Reproduced from Nepusz and Vicsek (2012). 
 
The minimum number of driver nodes (nodes that are driven from the outside in order to 
gain control over the entire network) is found to be largely determined by the joint degree 
distribution of the network.  
The following survey of 38 real-life networks, shown in Table 5.1, reveals that under this 
approach, transcriptional regulatory networks are well-controllable with a small number of driver 
nodes and also that most real-world networks are easier to control than random Erdős–Rényi 
networks with the same number of nodes and edges (last 3 columns). 
Note that this is in deep contrast with the findings of Liu et al. (2011), who have found that 
regulatory networks need a high fraction of driver nodes and that randomized Erdős-Rényi 
networks are easier to control than the real-world ones. 
The differences are very spectacular in highly hierarchical, tree-like networks as well, in 
which the presence of central out-hubs rapidly increase the required number of driver nodes 
within the framework of Liu et al., while the same out-hubs can efficiently control many 
subordinate nodes in the switchboard dynamics – and thus decrease the required number of 
driver nodes. This is a central result, since such hierarchies are ubiquitous in nature and society, 
from scales as small as gene regulatory networks through leader-follower relationships, up to 
large-scale organizations.  
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Table 5.1 Controllability properties of real networks. First five columns: (1) type of the network, (2) its number, 
(3) name, (4) number of nodes and (5) number of edges, respectively. 6
th
 column: nD
SBD 
 , fraction of driver nodes 
in the switchboard dynamics framework. 7
th
 column: nD
Liu 
 , fraction of driver nodes in the structural 
controllability framework, (overviewed in Sect. 5.3.1), and 8
th
 column: nD
ER 
 , fraction of driver nodes in the 
switchboard dynamics framework in randomized networks using the Erdős–Rényi model and nD
Dgr
 the degree-
preserving configuration model. References to the real systems data can be found in Table 1. and the reference list 
of the Supplementary Material to Nepusz and Vicsek (2012). 
 
*: Networks in which the edges have been reserved compared to the original publication. 
†: Results calculated from the degree distribution. From Nepusz and Vicsek (2012). 
 
Type # Name Nodes Edges nD
SBD
 nD
Liu
 nD
ER
 nD
Dgr
 
Regulatory 1 Ownership-USCorp 7,253 6,726 0.160 0.820 0.339 0.085 
 2 TRN-EC-2 418 519 0.222 0.751 0.366 0.148 
 3 TRN-Yeast-1 4,441 12,873 0.034 0.965 0.415 0.033 
 4 TRN-Yest-2 688 1,079 0.177 0.821 0.381 0.137 
Trust 5 Collage* 32 96 0.344 0.188 0.418 0.315 
 6 Epinions* 75,888 508,837 0.336 0.549 0.445 0.448 
 7 Prison* 67 182 0.403 0.134 0.411 0.451 
 8 Slashdot* 82,168 948,464 0.323 0.045 0.458 0.392 
 9 WikiVote* 7,115 103,689 0.281 0.666 0.463 0.620 
Food web 10 Grassland 88 137 0.318 0.523 0.381 0.297 
 11 Little Rock 183 2,494 0.639 0.541 0.463 0.649 
 12 SeaGrass 49 226 0.449 0.265 0.436 0.433 
 13 Ythan 135 601 0.304 0.511 0.432 0.337 
Metabolic 14 C. Elegans 1,173 2,864 0.182 0.302 0.409 0.309 
 15 E. coli 2,275 5,763 0.182 0.382 0.409 0.309 
 16 S. cerevisiae 1,511 3,833 0.185 0.329 0.409 0.313 
Electronic 
circuits 
17 s208a 122 189 0.451 0.238 0.381 0.431 
18 S420a 252 399 0.456 0.234 0.385 0.440 
 19 S838a 512 819 0.459 0.232 0.381 0.442 
Neuronal and 
brain 
20 C. elegans 297 2,359 0.549 0.165 0.449 0.499 
21 Macaque 45 463 0.333 0.022 0.446 0.457 
Citation 22 arXiv-HepPh* 34,546 421,578 0.356 0.232 0.459 0.577 
 23 arXiv-HepTh* 27,770 352,807 0.359 0.216 0.460 0.569 
WWW 24 Google 15,763 171,206 0.670 0.337 0.457 0.612 
 25 Polblogs 1,490 19,090 0.509 0.471 0.460 0.501 
 26 nd.edu 325,729 1,497,134 0.271 0.677 0.433 0.301 
 27 Standford.edu 281,904 2,312,497 0.665 0.317 0.450 0.653 
Internet 28 P2p-1 10,876 39,994 0.334 0.552 0.425 0.344 
 29 P2p-2 8,846 31,839 0.344 0.578 0.423 0.344 
 30 P2p-3 8,717 31,525 0.343 0.577 0.424 0.344 
Social 
communication 
31 Twitter*
†
 41.7*10
6
 1.47*10
9
 0.402 - 0.476 0.434 
32 UCIOnline 1,899 20,296 0.216 0.323 0.456 0.375 
 33 WikiTalk 2,394,385 5,021,410 0.022 0.968 0.399 0.026 
Organizational 34 Consulting* 46 879 0.522 0.043 0.458 0.460 
 35 Freemans-1* 34 645 0.412 0.088 0.441 0.476 
 36 Freemans-2* 34 830 0.588 0.029 0.439 0.465 
 37 Manufacturing* 77 2,228 0.597 0.013 0.468 0.424 
 38 University* 81 817 0.519 0.012 0.451 0.532 
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Thus, the central corollary of the above research is that the presence (or absence) of 
hierarchical structure appears to be an important factor in the controllability properties of large 
dynamical systems.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
In this Chapter we summarize the main lessons one can learn about hierarchy by considering the 
results presented in the previous Chapters. The first point we would like to make is that we 
concentrated on works involving quantitative results. There is a huge literature on the vast 
qualitative or ―narrative‖ interpretation of hierarchies, but the number of studies based on 
calculus is rather limited. As it was already mentioned in the introduction, in this book we 
describe studies related to hierarchy in general and the particular cases we consider have been 
related to that domains of nature, which can be described as assemblies of organisms that can 
communicate by processing information as unique individuals. 
Before going into some details, we would like to point out a very general aspect of 
hierarchy. According to the studies we presented, hierarchy and complexity (as it is understood 
when the expression of complex systems is used) are intimately related. Complex systems are 
usually associated with many units displaying a widely varying behaviour, but, more importantly 
for us, a property, which is summarized by the following statement: a complex system exhibits a 
qualitatively different behaviour (as a whole) from that of its units. Now, this is true for 
hierarchical systems as well with an addition that this emergence of new qualitative behaviour 
can be associated with the existence of ―hierarchical levels‖ of an underlying network in the 
systems. 
 
6.1 General features of hierarchical structures. 
 
Hierarchy has several manifestations. We classified these as order, embedded and flow 
hierarchies. The most compelling and complex of these is flow hierarchy that assumes directed 
or undirected interactions among its units. In order to characterise quantitatively the structure of 
a system having an underlying flow hierarchy is far from being trivial. This is true for the 
visualization of the hierarchical nature of the flow of information in a complex system. 
Correspondingly, in Chap. 2 we give many related details. As it turns out even the level of 
hierarchy is a problem that cannot be defined in a unique way. This is also true for visualizing 
the hierarchical nature of a system. We overviewed a number of suggestions to quantify and 
make hierarchy visible even for the case of flow hierarchies. 
In all cases a hierarchical system has ―levels‖. Sometimes these levels are well defined, but 
not always. Each level has its own behavioural patterns and may contain groups/units made of 
closely related organisms and separated from the other groups. 
We argue that the most complex representation of a hierarchical system can be achieved by 
considering an underlying network of directed and undirected edges. In fact, we also conclude 
that in a system of organisms interacting by exchanging and evaluating information, an approach 
based on flow hierarchy is the most suitable and this is what we mostly consider in the book. 
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6.2. Origins of flow hierarchy 
 
Our main observation is that complex hierarchical systems are usually implying the relevance of 
the flow of information. This is so in part because the units are not fully informed about their 
environment. The above flow can have several manifestations: for example, the less informed 
units copy information (either by freely provided or simply obtained by ―watching), or a person 
on a higher level giving orders to subordinates.  
Based on the observations and models presented in this book our main conclusions are that 
the origins of hierarchies in systems of organisms are related to two main factors:  
 
i) optimizing the functioning and   
ii) limits concerning the resources or costs involved.  
 
Before going into a bit more detail, we point out that in practice both i) and ii) become 
dominant factors due to the incomplete flow of incomplete information. If every participant was 
aware of the exact information all the time, hierarchy would not be needed in most of the real-
life cases. 
Next, we shortly discuss point i). First of all, optimization (searching for the best performing 
state/structure of the system) typically involves finding a ―synchronized‖ regime of behaviour of 
the agents/actors. We assume that complex systems of organisms are optimal from the point of 
their structure: this is due to a natural competition/selection principle in the Darwinian sense of 
the process. There are two possible main variants of this aspect. In the first case the individual 
units are ―selfish‖ they are trying to optimize only their own advantage from the interaction with 
the others. In this ―soft‖ hierarchy there is no external, global condition that would force the 
hierarchy to emerge. We could also associate these systems with a bottom up structure. All this 
can be studied both experimentally and by modelling.  
The other main version of hierarchy is due to the simultaneous action of both the above 
points i) and ii). It usually involves an external pressure (in the context of which the 
optimization, i.e., i) has to take place). In this ―hard‖ hierarchy optimizing in the presence of this 
pressure is the interest of the whole group of organisms and it becomes the main determinant of 
the hierarchy. Examples include armies or even universities. There is a global goal which has to 
be achieved (win the battle, educate in many areas as efficiently as possible). Such hierarchies 
usually involve that the direction of the ties between the units determine the behaviour of a 
subordinate as a function of the decision of the ―boss‖. They are clearly organized from top to 
bottom. 
The above points can also be approached from a more practical approach. Points i) and ii) 
can be best demonstrated by recalling two specific examples which, on the other hand, bear the 
essential features of most of the other possible examples. (A) Let us consider a system, in which 
the participants are trying to optimize their own performance by copying the decisions of those 
group mates who are better at making good decisions. Without limitations this process would 
inevitably lead to a star-like network with everyone following the decisions of the agent with the 
highest ability to make the right choices. However, if the number of connections an agent can 
manage (as it is in real life) is limited, the above structure cannot be maintained and rather, a 
cascade of information flow appears along a hierarchically organized network (also leading to a 
better average performance than independent decisions). (For example, if 3 is the maximum 
number of edges an agent can maintain, a simple tree-like structure – with one incoming and two 
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outgoing edges – can optimally result in the best information flowing from the top to the many 
agents at the bottom of the hierarchy in an optimal way). (B) The simplest everyday example one 
can mention is that of an army (already mentioned above). If the decisions concerning many 
people have to be made on a short time scale, a hierarchical organization has a great advantage. 
Here the limiting cost is time. Imagine an ―egalitarian‖ army fighting against a ―dictatorial‖ one. 
In short: until the egalitarian army – following many rounds of discussions – make the decision 
which tactics to choose, the dictatorial (hierarchical) army – using a simple strategy – can 
override them.  
 
 
6.3 Emergence of hierarchy 
 
Obviously, this is one of the most interesting questions one can raise in the context of 
hierarchies. Most of the related studies describe historical processes without calculations. 
However, there exist by now a few quantitatively treatable models giving insight into the 
―abstracts‖ process of emergence. 
The emergence of hierarchies can be discussed in terms of evolutionary biology and/or game 
theory, with a number of relevant differences. If one aims at incorporating realistic assumptions 
and the corresponding real-life like behaviours, than exact treatment is not possible. However, 
computer simulations are feasible (see, e.g., Chap 5). In addition, numerical experiments aimed 
at shedding light on particular aspects of emergence can be carried out which is hardly realizable 
in the context of evolution. 
Thus, we present in the book a few models that involve such notions (borrowed from game 
theory and evolutionary theory) as fitness, benefits and costs. These models include specific 
definitions/assumptions for the above notions and give new insight into the mechanisms or the 
reasons why hierarchy emerges from an originally random set of connections among the units of 
a system.  
Finally, our book, by the nature of the subject, is far from being complete. There are many 
more, and we expect, there will be much more works on the topic since the pool of phenomena 
related to hierarchy is inexhaustible. We wish that our book would stimulate works concentrating 
on quantitative treatments of this exciting field. 
 
 
